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international trade, agricultural markets and marketing. The dissertation is structured as 
three papers. The first paper, Chapter 1, evaluates the impact of agricultural trade policies.  
Imported shrimp, which comprises nearly ninety percent of all United States shrimp 
consumption, have become the subject of antidumping and countervailing duty 
investigations in the past decade. I estimate the import demand for shrimp in the United 
States from 1999-2014, using the Barten’s synthetic model. I test the hypothesis of 
possible structural breaks in the import demand introduced by various trade policies: 
antidumping/countervailing duty investigations and impositions, and import refusals due 
to safety and environmental issues. Results show that these import-restricting policies 
have significant effects on the import shrimp demand, indicating that the omission of 
them would lead to biased estimates.  
 
Chapter 2, the second paper, examines how the burden of state cigarette tax is 
divided between producers/retailers and consumers, by using the Nielsen store-level 
scanner data on cigarette prices from convenience stores over the period 2011–2012. 
Cigarette taxes were found more than fully passed through to retail prices on average, 
suggesting consumers pay excess burden and market power exists in the cigarette 
industry. Utilizing information on the attributes of cigarette products, we demonstrated 
that tax incidence varied by brand and package size: pass-through rates for premium 
brands and carton-packaged cigarettes are higher than those for discount brands and 
cigarettes in packs, respectively, indicating possibilities of different demand elasticities 
across product tiers. 
 
Chapter 3, the third paper, focuses on identifying the demographic characteristics 
of households buying organic coffee, by examining the factors that influence the 
probability that a consumer will buy organic coffee, and which factors affect the amount 
organic coffee purchased. Using nationally representative household level data from 
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 1 
Introduction  
 
 
This dissertation focuses on topics in areas of agricultural and food policy, international 
trade, agricultural markets and marketing. One overarching goal of this dissertation is to 
understand the economic effects of various agricultural policy instruments, both 
domestically and internationally. In general, the importance of policies such as 
investment in education, health and sanitary facilities, and transportation infrastructure-
which have a broad impact on agricultural sector productivity, has been an 
uncontroversial subject among economists, policy-makers, and development institutions. 
However, there is a set of policies that affects particular agricultural commodities or 
techniques of production, for which little consensus has emerged on appropriate levels of 
use. These commodity-specific policies include taxes, subsidies, international trade 
restrictions, and quantitative controls on particular outputs and inputs and policies that 
affect the macroprices (interest rates, wage rates, and exchange rates).  
Another goal is conduct consumer demand analysis for a specific product, 
particularly taking product differentiation into consideration, either by origin of country 
or by method of production. Consumer demand for food is an important element in the 
formulation of various agricultural and food policies. Estimates of consumer demand 
quantify the effects of prices and total expenditures on the demand for food, which in turn, 
informs policymakers and researchers about how consumers make food purchasing 
decisions and helps policymakers design effective nutrition policy. In addition, 
knowledge of consumers' demand can help producers make important decisions, such as 
whether to adjust production practices, adopt new technologies, or change marketing and 
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pricing strategies.  
The dissertation is structured as three papers. The first paper, Chapter 1, evaluates 
the impact of agricultural trade policies.  Imported shrimp, which comprises nearly ninety 
percent of all United States shrimp consumption, have become the subject of 
antidumping and countervailing duty investigations in the past decade. I estimate the 
import demand for shrimp in the United States from 1999-2014, using the Barten’s 
synthetic model. I test the hypothesis of possible structural breaks in the import demand 
introduced by various trade policies: antidumping/countervailing duty investigations and 
impositions, and import refusals due to safety and environmental issues. Results show 
that these import-restricting policies have significant effects on the import shrimp 
demand, indicating that the omission of them would lead to biased estimates.  
Chapter 2, the second paper, examines how the burden of state cigarette tax is 
divided between producers/retailers and consumers, by using the Nielsen store-level 
scanner data on cigarette prices from convenience stores over the period 2011–2012. 
Cigarette taxes were found more than fully passed through to retail prices on average, 
suggesting consumers pay excess burden and market power exists in the cigarette 
industry. Utilizing information on the attributes of cigarette products, we demonstrated 
that tax incidence varied by brand and package size: pass-through rates for premium 
brands and carton-packaged cigarettes are higher than those for discount brands and 
cigarettes in packs, respectively, indicating possibilities of different demand elasticities 
across product tiers. 
Chapter 3, the third paper, focuses on identifying the demographic characteristics 
of households buying organic coffee, by examining the factors that influence the 
 3 
probability that a consumer will buy organic coffee, and which factors affect the amount 
organic coffee purchased. Using nationally representative household level data from 
55,470 households over the period of 2011 to 2013 (Nielsen Homescan), and a censored 
demand model, we find that economic and demographic factors play a crucial role in the 
household choice of purchasing organic coffee. Furthermore, households are less 
sensitive to own-price changes in the case of organic coffee versus conventional coffee. 
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Chapter 1. The Impact of Antidumping/Countervailing Duties on Demand for 
Imported Shrimp in the United States 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
 
In recent years, imported shrimp has frequently been the subject of antidumping 
investigations (imports sold at less than fair value, LTFV) and countervailing duty 
investigations (subsidized imports) in the United States. On December 31, 2003, Ad Hoc 
Shrimp Trade Action Committee, Washington, DC — an ad hoc committee of vessel 
owners and shrimp processors — filed anti-dumping petitions with the Department of 
Commerce (DOC) against shrimp importers from six countries: Brazil, China, Ecuador, 
India, Thailand, and Vietnam. The Southern Shrimp Alliance (SSA) complained that they 
were the victims of "dumping" — that they were being driven out of business by foreign 
shrimp producers who were selling their shrimp at LTFV in the U.S. market.   
In January 2005, after one year of investigations, the U.S. International Trade 
Commission (USITC, Commission) found that the increasing quantity of subject imports 
forces the share of U.S. apparent consumption of domestic warmwater shrimp to decline 
from 15.2 percent in 2001 to 11.9 percent in 2003. The subject imports had significant 
price-depressing effects: when comparing prices of imported and domestic shrimp, the 
subject imports undersold the domestically processed product in 58.6 percent of all such 
comparisons. These declines in prices led to decreases in operating revenues for 
fishermen and processors, poor financial performance, and declining employment. The 
number of production and related workers dropped from 2,180 in 2001 to 1,616 in 2003. 
Over 65 percent of domestic processors had operating profits in 2001, over half the 
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producers had operating losses in 2002 and 2003 (USITC, 2005, p.29-44). Therefore, the 
USITC determined that an industry in the United States was materially injured
1
 by frozen 
warmwater shrimp imports, resulting in trade-weighted antidumping duties of 17.22 
percent on shrimp imports from the six countries found to be sold in the United States at 
LTFV (USITC, 2005; SSA, 2005) (Table 1). 
Table 1. U.S. Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Investigations on Imported Shrimp, 
1999-2014 
AD/CVD Country  Initiation Prelim  Final Duty Order Min 
Margin 
Max 
Margin 
5 Year 
Sunset 
Reviews  
(%) (%) 
AD Brazil 27-Jan-04 4-Aug-04 23-Dec-04 1-Feb-05 4.97 67.8 Continued 
AD Ecuador 27-Jan-04 4-Aug-04 23-Dec-04 1-Feb-05 2.48 4.42 Revoked** 
AD India 27-Jan-04 4-Aug-04 23-Dec-04 1-Feb-05 4.94 15.36 Continued 
AD Thailand 27-Jan-04 4-Aug-04 23-Dec-04 1-Feb-05 5.29 6.82 Continued 
AD China (PRC) 27-Jan-04 16-Jul-04 8-Dec-04 1-Feb-05 27.89 112.81 Continued 
AD Vietnam 27-Jan-04 16-Jul-04 8-Dec-04 1-Feb-05 4.3 25.76 Continued 
CVD China (PRC) 25-Jan-13 4-Jun-13 19-Aug-13 ITC Neg Final       
CVD Ecuador 25-Jan-13 4-Jun-13 19-Aug-13 ITC Neg Final       
CVD India 25-Jan-13 4-Jun-13 19-Aug-13 ITC Neg Final       
CVD Indonesia 25-Jan-13 4-Jun-13 19-Aug-13 ITC Terminated       
CVD Malaysia 25-Jan-13 4-Jun-13 19-Aug-13 ITC Neg Final       
CVD Thailand 25-Jan-13 4-Jun-13 19-Aug-13 ITC Terminated       
CVD Vietnam 25-Jan-13 4-Jun-13 19-Aug-13 ITC Neg Final       
Source. −United States Department of Commerce. International Trade Administration (ITC). 
Enforcement and Compliance. Antidumping and Countervailing Case Information. 
*
Antidumping duty order on frozen warmwater shrimp from Ecuador was revoked on August 15, 
2007 as a result of World Trade Organization (“WTO”) panel findings. (Federal Register /Vol. 72, 
No. 163 /Thursday, August 23, 2007.) 
 
On December 28, 2012, the Coalition of Gulf Shrimp Industries, Biloxi, MS, the 
same petitioner in the prior antidumping investigations, launched a petition, which 
alleged material injury by subsidized imports from China, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, 
                                                        
1 The statute defines “material injury” as “harm which is not inconsequential, immaterial, or 
unimportant.” In assessing whether the domestic industry is materially injured by reason of 
subject imports, the Commission considers all relevant economic factors that bear on the state of 
the industry in the United States (but only in the context of U.S. production operations). These 
factors include output, sales, inventories, capacity utilization, market share, employment, wages, 
productivity, profits, cash flow, return on investment, ability to raise capital, and research and 
development (19 U.S. Code § 1677(7)). 
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Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam. The petition requested the Commission and the DOC 
to impose duties on imports from these countries. On August 19, 2013, the DOC 
published its final determinations that certain frozen warmwater shrimp from China, 
Ecuador, India, Malaysia, and Vietnam received government subsidy rates
2
 ranging from 
18.1 %, 10.1 % to 13.5 %, 10.5 % to 11.1 %, 10.8 % to 54.5% and 1.1 % to 7.8 %, 
respectively, and negative determinations in the countervailing duty investigations of 
imports from Indonesia and Thailand (Table 1). However, the USITC later determined on 
October 21, 2013, that the domestic industry was neither materially injured or threatened 
with material injury, nor materially retarded by reason of imports from China, Ecuador, 
India, Malaysia, and Vietnam of frozen warmwater shrimp (USITC, 2013). 
 
Figure 1. U.S. Shrimp Imports Volume and Value, 1999-2014 
 (Data source: Aquaculture Data, ERS, USDA.) 
 
Undoubtedly, the increasing price-competitive imports have brought shrimp to 
attention for investigations. U.S. shrimp imports, valued at $6.7 billion in 2014, increased 
nearly 113% from 1999, with an average annual growth rate of 3.3% (Figure 1). Shrimp 
                                                        
2 The countervailable subsidy/ actionable subsidy is a subsidy described in Article 3 or 6.1 of the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, WTO, which includes a direct transfer of 
funds from the government (e.g. grants, loans, and equity infusion), tax incentives, export 
financing, etc. 
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imports accounted for 27 % of the value of total edible fishery products imports. Seven 
major suppliers have accounted for most of these imports. These exporting countries 
include China, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Thailand, and Vietnam. In 2014, 
imports from these seven countries accounted for 84 per cent of the total U.S. shrimp 
imports by volume. Thailand is the biggest source, accounting for about 29% of the 
imports in 2014 (Table 2). As for type of preparation, the majority of imported shrimp 
comes as frozen shrimp. During the period 1999 – 2014, frozen shrimp accounted for 
76.3% of the total imports by volume. Other forms of preparation include fresh (whether 
shell-on or peeled), canned, and breaded (Economic Research Service, 2014).  
Table 2. U.S. Shrimp Imports 1999-2014, Volume by Selected Sources 
Countries 1999-2014 (Million Pounds) Share to total (%) 
Thailand 5,185.99 29 
Ecuador 1,919 11 
China (Mainland) 1,539.82 9 
Indonesia 1,870.8 10 
Mexico 1,500.71 8 
India 1,040.07 6 
Vietnam 1,487.36 8 
Malaysia 512.88 3 
ROW 2,762.44 16 
Total 17,819.08 100 
Source. − Aquaculture Data, ERS, USDA.  
 
Increases in U.S. shrimp imports have been driven by steady increases in United 
States per capita shrimp consumption. Shrimp has been the most consumed seafood in the 
U.S. since 2001, followed by canned tuna and salmon.  In 1999, per capita shrimp 
consumption was 3.0 pounds, while U.S. per capita shrimp consumption was 4.2 pounds 
in 2011. U.S. shrimp consumers rely heavily on imports, which provided 93% of the total 
supply in 2011 (National Marine Fisheries Services, 2012).  
In contrast, the domestic production of shrimp has been decreasing. The average 
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of U.S. commercial landings of shrimp was 282 million pounds for the years 2007-2011, 
which fell from 318 million pounds for the years 1999-2003. Estimated shrimp 
production from aquaculture and breaded shrimp production have fluctuated but both 
have declining trends from 1999 to 2012. Shrimp from aquaculture was 4.6 million 
pounds ($13.7 million in value) in 1999; it fell down by 24% to 3.5 million pounds ($6.1 
million in value) in 2011. The production of breaded shrimp in 2012 was 79.7 million 
pounds valued at $194 million, while in 1999 production was 119.1 million pounds 
valued at $352 million.  
     As one of the primary seafood commodities traded in the US seafood market, 
shrimp have constantly been the subject of trade remedy laws investigations. Surprisingly, 
little work has been conducted to assess the degree to which import demand changes as 
relative prices by source of imports. There is only one study to our knowledge that 
empirically investigates the shrimp import demand in the US.  Jones, et al. (2008) 
estimate the U.S. demand for domestic and imported shrimp differentiated by exporting 
country from January 1995 to December 2005 using a Netherlands Central Bureau 
Statistic (CBS) demand system model. They test the monthly seasonality and stability of 
demand from each country and predicted that despite the countervailing duties imposed 
by the United States, shrimp demand from these countries would remain fairly stable. 
They assume that the import demands for shrimp are not affected by trade policies, even 
though antidumping duties are imposed during their study period. 
There is a literature on the trade effects of the temporary trade barrier (TTB) 
policies/ trade remedy laws (antidumping, countervailing duties and safeguards), but it 
concentrates on the manufacturing industry (Blonigen, 2003a; Blonigen, 2003b; Bown 
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and Crowley, 2007; Vandenbussche and Zanardi 2010; Pierce, 2011). One interesting 
phenomenon, which is found in some literature on the trade effects of antidumping duties 
is that the mere initiation of an unfair trade investigation reduces imports from the 
targeted country even when no final AD duties are levied, which is referred to the 
‘investigation effect’ or ‘harassment effect’ (Prusa, 1992; Staiger and Wolak, 1994; Prusa, 
2001). 
There are a few studies that focus on the TTB policies for the agricultural sector. 
Carter and Gunning-Trant (2010) did an empirical study U.S. agricultural antidumping 
and countervailing duty cases from 1980 to 2005. They find that when the ruling is 
affirmative and AD or CVD duties are imposed, trade destruction affects U.S. 
agricultural imports from named countries for at least three years after the investigation 
year. In contrast to previous literature’s findings for manufactures, they find no evidence 
of an investigation effect when the ruling is negative in their study of antidumping duties 
and no significant trade diversion in the U.S. agriculture sector. For disaggregate 
commodity studies, Asche (2001) investigates the case of US imposition of antidumping 
duties against Norwegian Salmon in 1991 and finds significant trade destructive and price 
effects of the antidumping duty. Malhotra, Rus, and Kassam (2008) and Keithly and 
Poudel (2008) are two descriptive analyses on antidumping legislation on U.S. imports of 
fresh tomatoes and shrimp. Notably, the latter find significant investigation and trade 
diversion effects, which contradicts Carter and Gunning-Trant (2010)’s finding and 
makes their principal assumption that the estimated parameters are identical across panels 
questionable.  Also Keithly and Poudel (2008) point out the trade effect of antidumping 
duties on subject products and non-subject products. Carter and Mohapatra (2013) 
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measure the responsiveness of U.S. domestic frozen concentrated orange juice (FCOJ) 
prices to imports from Brazil, in light of the imposition of antidumping duties on orange 
juice from Brazil in 2006. They model the role of inventories and find that there is only a 
very weak FCOJ domestic price response to imports from Brazil. 
We explicitly model trade policies in a system-wide demand analysis approach 
and investigate the impact of antidumping/countervailing duties on the U.S. demand for 
imported shrimp, using monthly data differentiated by country of origin during the 
January 1999 through August 2014 time period. Specific objectives of this paper are (1) 
to estimate econometrically the demand for imported shrimp in the U.S. by country of 
origin, (2) to measure the impact of antidumping/countervailing duties on import demand 
and to obtain demand elasticities from the empirically estimated import demand 
parameters, (3) to conclude and discuss potential policy implications from the results. 
 
1.2 Empirical methods 
 
 
We assume that shrimp is differentiated by exporting source where Thai, Ecuadorian, 
Chinese shrimp, etc., are treated as individual products that make up the product group. 
Source differentiation implies that shrimp from one country is an imperfect substitute for 
shrimp from another country. To limit the analysis to shrimp, we assume a multistage 
budgeting process where total expenditures are first allocated across product groups and 
then group expenditures are allocated across the goods within each product group. In this 
context, total shrimp demand is determined in the first stage, and conditional on total 
shrimp expenditures, the demand for shrimp from each source is determined in the 
second stage (Seale et al. 1992). Preferences are assumed to be blockwise dependent 
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(block independence) or weakly separable at the product group level, which implies that 
the utility interaction between shrimp and non-shrimp products is either zero (strong 
separability) or independent of the country of origin (weak separability) (Theil and 
Clements, 1987). Given the focus on imports, it also assumed that domestically produced 
and imported shrimp are weakly separable. The separability assumption is plausible 
because domestic shrimp is often considered superior to imports due to the high quality 
(wild caught). However, limited data did not allow for domestic shrimp to be included in 
the model. 
Four popular demand systems are commonly used in the empirical analysis of 
consumer behavior to analyze agricultural import demand: Almost Ideal Demand System 
(AIDS) (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980), the Rotterdam (Theil, 1965), National Bureau of 
Research (NBR) (Neves, 1987), and Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) (Keller and Van 
Driel, 1985) models. All of these models are based on consumer theory and derived from 
utility maximization. In addition, they are all constructed to satisfy the adding-up, 
homogeneity, and symmetry theoretical restrictions. In spite of the similarities, however, 
there is little guidance on how to choose a particular functional form from among the set 
of alternatives.  
Barten (1993) nests differential versions of the four demand systems into a 
synthetic model by exploiting the similarities among the models. He parameterizes, rather 
than assumes, the impacts of expenditure shares on marginal expenditure shares and 
Slutsky substitution terms. Due to its nesting of the four functional forms, Barten’s 
synthetic model and its several variants have been widely used for demand estimation of 
agricultural products (Brown, Lee, and Seale, 1995; Eales, Durham and Wessells, 1997; 
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Maynard and Veeramani, 2003; Okrent and Alston, 2012). Another attractive feature of 
the model is the flexibility to add more variables into the system in order to explain the 
variation in demand, such as advertising and other demand shifters. 
Barten’s synthetic model takes the following form:  
     𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑑𝑙𝑛𝑞𝑖𝑡 = 𝑐𝑖 + (𝛼𝑖 + 𝛿1𝑤𝑖𝑡)𝑑𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑡
+ ∑ (𝑏𝑖𝑗 − 𝛿2𝑤𝑖𝑡(𝛿𝑖𝑗 − 𝑤𝑗𝑡)) 𝑑𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜉𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑗=1
, 
𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛, 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇.                                                 (1) 
 
where subscripts I, j represent different goods, n denotes the number of goods; t denotes 
the time period and T denotes the sample size;  
 𝑞𝑖 and  𝑝𝑗 are the price and quantity for good I and j respectively;  
wit is the expenditure share of the ith good in time period t 
(wit= 𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑞𝑖𝑡/∑  𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑞𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 );   
𝑑𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑡 is a Divisia volume index, that is 𝑑𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑡 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑑𝑙𝑛𝑞𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 ; 
𝑐𝑖  is the constant term to represent changes in consumer preferences or 
technologies; 
𝛼𝑖  and 𝑏𝑖𝑗  are expenditure and price coefficients to be estimated (assumed 
constant); 𝛿1 and 𝛿2 are nesting parameters; 𝛿𝑖𝑗 denotes the Kronecker delta, which is 1 
when i=j, 0 otherwise; 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of other control variables or demand shifters;  
𝜉𝑖 is the random error term. 
Restricting the values of the nesting parameters (𝛿1 and 𝛿2) yields the following 
demand systems: 
Rotterdam:     δ1 = 0 and  δ2 = 0; 
FDLAIDS:    δ1 = 1 and  δ2 = 1; 
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CBS:  δ1 = 1 and  δ2 = 0; 
NBR:  δ1 = 0 and  δ2 = 1. 
By testing the nesting parameters, we could find out whether any of the systems 
nested within the Barten’s synthetic model are consistent with the data, given the 
maintained hypothesis that one of the differential forms is appropriate.  
Elasticities are calculated from estimates as follows (typically at the sample 
means): 
expenditure elasticity 
𝑖 = (𝛼𝑖 + 𝛿1wi̅)/wi̅ 
compensated (Hicksian) price elasticity 
𝑖𝑗 = (𝑏𝑖𝑗 − 𝛿2𝑤i̅(𝛿𝑖𝑗 − 𝑤j̅)) /wi̅  
uncompensated (Marshallian) price elasticity 
𝑖𝑗
∗ = 𝑖𝑗 + 𝑤j̅ 𝑖 
Restrictions from consumer demand theory can be invoked a prior or tested: 
adding-up (∑ 𝑏𝑖𝑗 = 0, ∑ 𝑎𝑖 = 1 − 𝛿1
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛
𝑖=1 ) , homogeneity (∑ 𝑏𝑖𝑗 = 0)
𝑛
𝑗=1 , and Slutsky 
symmetry (𝑏𝑖𝑗 = 𝑏𝑗𝑖). Adding-up (i.e. the expenditure shares sum across n goods equal 1) 
is automatically satisfied by construction and implies that the resulting demand system is 
singular. Homogeneity implies that the sum of the price coefficients is 0 within a given 
demand equation; and symmetry means that the compensated (Hicksian) substitution 
matrix should be symmetric, e.g. the appropriate cross-price parameters between 
equations are equal.  
Barten’s synthetic model is in essence a system of differential demand equations 
in which all variables are presented in terms of infinitesimal changes. For application to 
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discrete data, the infinitesimal changes in Equation (1) are approximated by their discrete 
definite differences. As monthly data are used in this study, the twelfth differencing is 
applied to correct for seasonality of each variable (Seale, Marchant, and Basso, 2003): 
𝑑𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑡  is replaced with the change in the logarithm of 𝑞𝑡  from period t -12 to t, e.g., 
𝑑𝑙𝑛𝑞𝑡 ≈ ∆𝑙𝑛𝑞𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛(𝑞𝑖𝑡) − 𝑙𝑛 (𝑞𝑖𝑡−12) ; 𝑑𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑡 ≈ ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑡∆𝑙𝑛𝑞𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 ,  𝑑𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑡 ≈ ∆𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑡 =
𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑖𝑡) − 𝑙𝑛 (𝑝𝑖𝑡−12) , ∀ 𝑖 = 1 … 𝑛 . As a convention, expenditure shares wit are all 
replaced by their arithmetic average of the expenditure share in t-12 and t, 𝑓𝑖𝑡=(wi, t+wi, 
t-12)/2 in both estimations and the calculation of elasticities. 
1.3 Variable construction and data  
 
 
Monthly import expenditures and quantities by country from January 1999 to August 
2014 are obtained from the Foreign Agricultural Trade Statistics (U.S. Department of 
Agriculture). Import values are on a cost-insurance-freight basis. The eight major 
exporting countries for shrimp to the U.S. are China, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Thailand, and Vietnam. The ROW (rest of the world) is an aggregation of the 
exporting countries not specified. Using expenditures and quantities, unit values are 
calculated as proxies for import prices (dollar per pound). Imported shrimp is an 
aggregation for 31 products of 10-digit HS codes (or 6 products of 6-digit HS codes
3
) 
(under the 2014 Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTS)) including all 
types of preparation.       
A summary of the descriptive statistics is presented in Table 3. During the data 
period, Thailand had the largest average share (29.8%), accounting for almost one third 
                                                        
3 
According to the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (2014), shrimp products are 
under 6-digit HS codes: 0306.16, 0306.17, 0306.26, 0306.27; 1605.21 and 1605.29. 
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of total U.S. shrimp imports. The ROW came in second with a 14.9% share, while China 
and Malaysia had the smallest shares (6% and 2.3%, respectively). Shrimp from Vietnam 
and Mexico was the most expensive, on average, with prices at $5.37 and $5.11/lbs., 
respectively. The mean price of shrimp from China was the lowest of all imported 
products ($2.78/lbs.). 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics on U.S. Imports of Shrimp by Country: January 1999 – 
August 2014 
 China Ecuador India Indonesia Malaysia Mexico Thailand Vietnam ROW 
Import price ($ per lb) 
Mean 2.78 3.26 4.32 4.14 3.70 5.11 3.98 5.37 3.41 
SD 0.57 0.72 0.67 0.83 0.87 1.17 0.90 0.81 0.56 
Min 1.59 2.27 2.45 2.43 1.89 2.98 2.65 3.86 2.48 
Max 4.65 5.21 6.47 6.63 6.59 9.06 6.44 8.04 4.87 
Import quantity (1,000 lbs) 
Mean 8,064   9,897   7,419   9,507   2,643   5,367   27,253   7,614  14,481  
SD  5,289   4,418   4,957   5,112   2,451   5,601   11,014   4,055   5,136  
Min  745   2,326   1,414   1,792   32   102   7,321   367   5,623  
Max 25,417  22,719  25,113   23,171  11,852  25,249  54,978  17,774  28,827  
Import share (%)  
Mean 0.060 0.095 0.089 0.109 0.023 0.070 0.298 0.107 0.149 
SD 0.032 0.048 0.049 0.055 0.018 0.060 0.078 0.039 0.067 
Min 0.006 0.022 0.019 0.021 0.000 0.001 0.100 0.014 0.056 
Max 0.171 0.291 0.241 0.264 0.066 0.260 0.466 0.189 0.354 
 
We tested the monthly series of expenditure shares and logged values of prices 
and quantities for stationarity. Unit roots tests include the augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF)(1979), Phillips-Perron (PP) (1988), and Dickey-Fuller generalized least squares 
(DFGLS) (Elliott, Rothenberg and Stock 1996). They test the null hypothesis of a unit 
root process against the alternative hypothesis of stationarity. The DFGLS test has 
substantially improved power over the other two tests when an unknown mean or trend is 
present (Elliot, Rothenberg, and Stock, 1996).  An alternative to the DFGLS test is the 
Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin (KPSS) (1992) test, which tests the null of 
trend stationarity against the alternative of a unit root. The KPSS test is often used in 
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conjunction with those tests to detect “long memory” or fractional integration; a 
noninteger value of the integration parameter implies that the series is neither I (0) nor I 
(1) (Lee and Schmidt, 1996 and Baum, 2001). With the DFGLS test (Table 4), we failed 
to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root for all the monthly logged import quantities, 
prices, and expenditure shares series. Using the KPSS test, we could not reject the null 
hypothesis of trend stationarity in favor of a unit root process for all the series except for 
logged prices for Vietnam, and expenditure shares of Indonesia, Mexico and the ROW. 
Detection of unit roots in these data suggests that a differencing approach to estimation is 
necessary. 
Table 4. Tests for Unit Roots in Monthly Shrimp Import Quantities, Prices, and 
Expenditure Shares 
  
Quantities 
  
Prices  
  
Expenditure Shares 
 
No. of 
Lags 
Test 
Statistic 
5% 
Critical 
Value 
No. of 
Lags 
Test 
Statistic 
5% 
Critical 
Value 
No. of 
Lags 
Test 
Statistic 
5% 
Critical 
Value 
Dickey-Fuller Generalized Least Squares (DFGLS)     H0: I(1)   
China 10 -0.400 -2.845 12 -1.707 -2.814 12 -1.123 -2.814 
Ecuador 12 -1.411 -2.814 13 -2.131 -2.798 9 -0.432 -2.860 
India 13 -0.990 -2.798 10 -1.391 -2.845 13 -0.860 -2.798 
Indonesia 12 -1.555 -2.814 3 -1.507            -2.936             12 -2.404 -2.814 
Malaysia 8 -1.545   -2.873 11 -2.113 -2.835    10 -1.685   -2.848 
Mexico 12 -2.102 -2.814 12 -2.040 -2.814 12 -1.518 -2.814 
Thailand 12 -2.087 -2.814 11 -1.512 -2.830 12 -1.378 -2.814 
Vietnam 9 -0.550 -2.860 13 -3.313 -2.798 7 -1.223 -2.888 
ROW 10 -0.354 -2.845 13 -2.255 -2.798 12 -1.884 -2.814 
Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin (KPSS)        H0: I(0) 
China 10 0.32 0.146 12 0.231 0.146 12 0.22 0.146 
Ecuador 12 0.185 0.146 13 0.269 0.146 9 0.193 0.146 
India 13 0.173 0.146 2 0.162 0.146 13 0.17 0.146 
Indonesia 12 0.223 0.146 3 0.821 0.146 12 0.127 0.146 
Malaysia 8 0.355 0.146 11 0.229 0.146 10 0.278 0.146 
Mexico 12 .0796 0.146 1 0.172 0.146 12 0.0974 0.146 
Thailand 10   0.152 0.146 11 0.333 0.146 12 0.201 0.146 
Vietnam 9 0.257 0.146 13 0.13 0.146 7 0.281 0.146 
ROW 10 0.358 0.146 13 0.216 0.146 12 0.139 0.146 
 
Note. − The unit root tests were applied to the levels of expenditure shares and the logarithmic 
transformations of the price and quantity. For the DFGLS test, lag length was determined by the 
Ng-Perron sequential t-test procedure. Critical values for the DFGLS test and the KPSS test 
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reported in this table can be found in Elliot, Rothenberg, and Stock (1996) and Kwiatkowski, et al. 
(1992) respectively. 
 
In order to capture the investigation effect of the AD/CVD investigations that 
occurred during the study period, we include time dummy variables (𝐴𝐷𝐼𝐸𝑡 ), which 
denote investigation periods (=1 for the investigation period, i.e., the month of 
investigation initiation to the month of final ruling). Antidumping duties were imposed 
for imports from Brazil, China, Ecuador, India, Thailand and Vietnam on February 1, 
2005. The trade-weighted average dumping margins for the named countries are 
incorporated into the model
4
 to measure the impact of antidumping duties on demand 
(United States International Trade Commission, 1995). These variables(Δ𝜏𝑖𝑡 ) are the 
changes of assigned dumping margins (in levels) for products exported to the U.S. from 
the named countries. Information of preliminary, final, and Sunset (five-year reviews) 
antidumping and countervailing duties are from the United States International Trade 
Commission, and the International Trade Administration, United States Department of 
Commerce. Rates of AD are obtained from various issues of the Federal Register. Prior to 
the months of final determination, AD duty rates are set to zero. The duties in our sample 
range from a minimum of 2.48% against imports of shrimp from Ecuador to a maximum 
112.81% against China. 
As the investigation period for each country differs, we use two CVD 
investigation dummies  (CVDIEt) . For named countries Indonesia and Thailand, the 
                                                        
4  Antidumping duty rates are calculated as monthly weighted-average dumping margin 
percentages for each exporter. The weight is the ratio of dumped import quantities to the total 
value of U.S. sales during the period of investigation. The weighted-average margins for these 
individual firms are then weight-averaged to calculate an “All Others” rate to be applied to 
imports from firms that were not investigated (International Trade Administration, 2009). This 
rate can be regarded as the average tariff for each named country. AD duties are reviewed on an 
annual basis and are often revised. Sunset reviews of AD orders are conducted five years after 
they become effective. 
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investigation period is from Jan-Aug 2013. For named countries China, Ecuador, India, 
Malaysia, Vietnam and non-named countries, the investigation period is from Jan-Oct 
2013 (Table 4). 
By including both investigation dummies and antidumping duty rates, we are able 
to track the effects of the antidumping ruling in all its phases, from the initiation of the 
investigation, determination of antidumping duty rates, and to the periods of antidumping 
imposition.  
In addition, we have two import restriction variables  (𝐼𝑀𝑅𝐸𝑖)  for China and 
Mexico, regarding safety and environmental concerns. One for China is the import 
refusal due to drug residuals in shrimp of some exporting companies from July to Oct 
2007 (FDA, 2007). In March 2010, the U.S. withdrew the Mexican shrimp importation 
certification under the Sea Turtle Protection Law. The import ban was removed on 
October 15, 2010, when Mexico’s Turtle Excluder Device (TED) program certification 
was reinstated (CBP, 2010). 
 
1.3.1 Test of endogeneity 
 
Since we only estimate the demand side of imported shrimp, it is a common practice to 
test price endogeniety to determine whether to use instruments from the supply side. The 
Wu-Hausman endogeniety test, as described in Johnson and DiNardo (1997, P. 342), was 
employed in this study to jointly test for endogeniety of import price variables. 
Instruments include price lags, input prices and supply shocks. One major input for 
shrimp production is feed (mainly fishmeal). Thus we use monthly nominal fishmeal 
prices from the Global Economic Monitor (GEM) Commodities database, World 
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Databank (2014) as an instrument.  The supply shocks take the form of dummy variables 
indicating epidemics and natural disasters (=1, for Thailand from Aug 2011 to Dec 2012, 
accounting for the flood and the outbreaks of Early Mortality Syndrome (EMS);  =1 for 
Ecuador from May 1999 to Dec 2000, White spot syndrome (WSS); =1 for China from 
Sept 2009 to Jul 2011, WSS and EMS; =1 for Vietnam EMS outbreaks from Jan 2011 to 
Dec 2012, =0 for all other time periods) (FAO, 2013). First, each import price was 
regressed on the aforementioned instruments, and the residuals from the price equations 
were then included as explanatory variables in the original demand models. Exogeneity is 
implied by the coefficients on these residuals being statistically zero. Test results indicate 
that the estimates on these residuals were not significantly different from zero. Thus, 
price exogeneity could not be rejected. The demand system can be consistently estimated 
via seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) without resorting to an IV estimator such as 
3SLS. 
So the final estimation equation is a Rotterdam model: 
   𝑓𝑖𝑡∆𝑙𝑛𝑞𝑖𝑡 = 𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖∆𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑡
+ ∑ 𝑏𝑖𝑗∆𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽0𝐴𝐷𝐼𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽1𝛥𝜏𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑉𝐷𝐼𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑀𝑅𝐸𝑖 + 𝜉𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑗=1
 
(2) 
 
1.4 Estimation results and discussion 
 
 
Barten’s synthetic model is used for model selection and estimated by iterated 
seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) (Stata version 13), which uses the asymptotically 
efficient, iterative feasible generalized least-squares (FGLS) algorithm described in 
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Greene (2012, 292–304). In order to deal with the singularity problem, the equation of 
the ROW is dropped from estimation. FGLS yields maximum-likelihood estimates of the 
demand parameters to ensure invariance with respect to the choice of which equations are 
deleted (Barten, 1969)
5
.  
First, we test the functional form by using Wald and the likelihood ratio tests 
(Table 5). For the Wald test, the joint null hypothesis δ1 = δ2 = 0 cannot be rejected at 
the 5% level of significance. (The significance level of the hypothesis test is 53%, we 
cannot reject it at any significance level below 53%.) For the likelihood ratio test, the 
unrestricted synthetic model rejects all of the models except for the Rotterdam model at 
the 5% level of significance (the p-value on the likelihood ratio test statistics is 0.21). 
Also by Akaike's and Bayesian information criteria, the Rotterdam model has the 
smallest values for both, indicating a better-fitting model. Therefore, the Rotterdam 
model is selected to estimate the demand system. 
Table 5. Wald Tests and Log-Likelihood Ratio Tests for Nested Models of Barten’s 
Synthetic Model 
Wald Tests and Log-Likelihood Ratio Tests for Nested Models of Barten’s Synthetic Model 
 
Wald test 
𝜒2(2) 
p-value  
Likelihood  
Ratio Test 
p-value AIC BIC 
Rotterdam  
 (δ1 = δ2 = 0) 
1.26 0.53 2089.25     0.21 -4094.50    -3966.68 
FDLAIDS  
 (δ1 = δ2 = 1) 
1783.55 0.00 2068.45      0.00 -4052.89    -3925.07 
CBS (δ1 = 1, 
δ2 = 0) 
1881.74 0.00 2025.93      0.00 -3967.85    -3840.03 
NBR (δ1 = 0, 
δ2 = 1) 
78.73 0.00 2049.23      0.00 -4014.45    -3886.63 
Continued 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
5 We checked that our estimates were indeed invariant to the equation eliminated by arbitrarily 
omitting different equations, and comparing parameter estimates, standard errors. 
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Table 5. Continued 
Likelihood Ratio Test Results for Theoretical Constraints for the Rotterdam model 
Model 
Restrictions 
Log-
likelihood 
value 
LR Statistic P-value    
Unrestricted 3976.35 21.93 0.003(7)*    
Homogeneity 3965.38  44.30 
 
0.002(21) 
   
Symmetry 3954.20  75.82 0.000(28)    
Homogeneity 
and Symmetry 
3938.44 21.93 0.003(7)    
 
Note. − 
*
 The numbers of restrictions are in parentheses.  
 
We then tested whether the data supported the restrictions of homogeneity and 
symmetry from demand theory. If those theoretical constraints are not rejected, we can 
impose them to save some degrees of freedom and gain efficiency (Capps Jr, et al. 2003). 
Both models are estimated in four ways: (1) without homogeneity or symmetry 
(unrestricted), (2) with homogeneity imposed, (3) with symmetry imposed, and (4) with 
homogeneity and symmetry jointly imposed (restricted models). Log-likelihood ratio 
(LR) tests are employed in pairwise comparison for each restricted model against the 
unrestricted model. Log-likelihood values and the chi-square (LR) test statistics and p-
values are given in Table 5. Homogeneity and symmetry (both singly and jointly 
imposed) were overwhelmingly rejected at any reasonable significance level
6
 and are not 
imposed.  
After fitting the model using SUR, we conduct a Breusch-Pagan test of 
independence based on the correlation matrix. Test statistics reject the null hypothesis 
that there are no correlations among the disturbances. It suggests that there is likely to be 
                                                        
6 The rejection of homogeneity and symmetry is common in past consumer demand studies (e.g. 
Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980; Bryant and Davis, 2008; Muhammad and Jones, 2011). This may 
be due to inappropriate asymptotic standard tests that are biased towards rejecting the 
homogeneity and symmetry conditions. The likelihood ratio test statistics is asymptotically 
distributed as chi-square. Using finite sample may get test statistics with lower values 
(Syriopoulos and Thea Sinclair, 1993; Keuzenkamp, and Barten, 1995; Chambers and Nowman, 
1997). 
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some gain in efficiency by using SUR rather than fitting the model separately by OLS. 
 
1.4.1 Estimation results  
 
 
Estimation results for imported shrimp by source are presented in Table 6. We find 
significantly negative AD investigation effects for China, India, and Vietnam (named 
countries) and positive investigation effects for the Indonesia and Malaysia (non-named 
country), which is consistent with the findings from previous studies (Staiger and Wolak, 
1994; Prusa, 2001)
7
. This phenomenon indicates that in order to deal with the 
uncertainties regarding the AD rulings, U.S. buyers of imported shrimp responded in the 
investigation phase (Jan–Dec 2004), even before the antidumping duties were officially 
imposed. Because establishing sound and reliable ties with new suppliers requires time 
and planning, importers seek new suppliers from countries not targeted by the tariff 
before any official rulings are made. Investigation effects are not statistically significant 
for Ecuador and Thailand (named countries) and Mexico (non-named). 
To understand the magnitude of the effect, we use results from the Rotterdam 
model (Table 6) and follow the formula in Greene (2012, P150) to calculate the 
percentage change in the dependent variable associated with AD investigation dummy 
variables. The quantities demanded for imported shrimp from China, India and Vietnam 
decreased by 4.30%, 2.76% and 5.73%, respectively, during the investigation period, 
                                                        
7 Staiger and Wolak examined the trade impacts of U.S. antidum 
ping law and the determinants of suit-filing activity from 1980 to 1985. They found that during 
the investigation period a petitioning firm benefits from roughly one-half of the decline in imports 
that would have occurred if final AD duties had been imposed from the initial date of filing. Prusa 
also analyzed antidumping effects by the United States from 1987 to 1997. He found that imports 
fall dramatically during the investigation period, regardless of the case's ultimate outcome. 
Specifically, the value of imports from named countries falls by 50-70 per cent over the first three 
years of protection. 
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while the demand for Indonesia and Malaysia shrimp increased by 6.08% and 4.92%, 
respectively. The AD investigation does not have a statistically significant effect on 
shrimp imports from Thailand. 
Table 6. Parameter Estimates of Demand for Imported Shrimp by Source in the U.S. 
 
Demand For Imports From 
 
 
China Ecuador India Indonesia Malaysia Mexico Thailand Vietnam 
Prices of Imports From 
 
 China -0.050** 0.019 0.000 -0.054** -0.002 0.025 0.081** 0.023 
 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.013) (0.020) (0.040) (0.024) 
Ecuador 0.028 -0.077*** 0.051* 0.052** -0.027 -0.105*** 0.062 -0.009 
 
(0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.017) (0.026) (0.049) (0.030) 
India 0.057*** 0.009 -0.058*** -0.005 -0.028** -0.022 -0.048 0.036 
 
(0.022) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) (0.014) (0.021) (0.042) (0.027) 
Indonesia -0.176*** 0.031 -0.029 -0.026 0.063*** 0.041 -0.032 0.059 
 
(0.034) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.022) (0.035) (0.067) (0.042) 
Malaysia -0.011 -0.035*** 0.029** -0.010 0.002 0.019* 0.044** 0.008 
 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.007) (0.011) (0.022) (0.014) 
Mexico -0.009 0.013 -0.000 0.024** 0.008 -0.034*** -0.048** 0.056*** 
 
(0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.008) (0.012) (0.023) (0.014) 
Thailand 0.054 0.044 0.028 0.099*** 0.001 0.030 -0.169** -0.064 
 
(0.036) (0.033) (0.037) (0.035) (0.022) (0.036) (0.067) (0.042) 
Vietnam 0.080*** -0.022 -0.014 -0.048** -0.033** -0.010 0.050 -0.028 
 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.014) (0.022) (0.044) (0.027) 
ROW 0.003 0.022 -0.009 0.038 0.018 0.021 0.039 -0.051 
 
(0.028) (0.027) (0.030) (0.030) (0.018) (0.029) (0.055) (0.035) 
Divisia index 0.118*** 0.038** 0.121*** 0.048*** 0.016 0.054*** 0.384*** 0.171*** 
 
(0.016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.010) (0.016) (0.031) (0.019) 
Exchange rate 
0.039 -0.094*** -0.008 0.008 -0.107*** -0.006 -0.085* 
 (0.084) (0.023) (0.024) (0.015) (0.028) (0.022) (0.046) 
 AD 
Investigation -0.044*** 0.007 -0.028*** 0.059*** 0.048*** 0.002 -0.031* -0.059*** 
Effects (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.006) (0.009) (0.018) (0.011) 
Antidumping -0.026*** 0.120 -0.014 NA 
 
NA NA 1.149*** -0.043 
Duties (0.008) (0.149) (0.090) 
  
(0.254) (0.040) 
CVD 
investigation 
0.004 -0.018* 0.064*** -0.022** -0.035*** -0.000 -0.018 0.021* 
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.006) (0.010) (0.019) (0.011) 
Import alert or 
refusal 
-0.032*** NA NA NA NA -0.036*** NA NA 
(0.011) 
    
(0.008) 
  Intercepts 0.008** 0.005** 0.007** 0.006** 0.000 -0.003 -0.015*** 0.009*** 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) 
Observations 176 176 176 176 176 176 176 176 
R2 0.576 0.655 0.442 0.352 0.478 0.385 0.661 0.577 
Note. −Standard errors in parentheses. 
***
, 
**
, and 
*
 denote the significance levels of 1%, 5% and 
10%. 
 
Data from the report of Fisheries of the United States 2004 (National Marine 
Fisheries Service, NMFS) and trade statistics on U.S. shrimp imports, Economic 
Research Service (ERS) also can demonstrate this investigation effect. In 2003, shrimp 
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imports from Brazil, China, Ecuador, India, Thailand, and Vietnam totaled more than 822 
million pounds, accounting for 74 % of total shrimp imports. In 2004, the year the 
Department of Commerce investigated the anti-dumping petition; imports from the six 
countries targeted by the anti-dumping petition fell 12 % to 712 million pounds, 
amounting to 62 % of total shrimp imports. Brazilian exports of shrimp were seriously 
affected by the antidumping duties. During the investigation year of 2004, imports from 
Brazil plummeted from 48 million pounds in 2003 to 20 million pounds, finally falling to 
zero imports in 2007.  
Yet total U.S. shrimp imports rose to 1.1 billion pounds in 2004, 28.9 million 
pounds more than the quantity imported in 2003, an increase of almost 3%. Shrimp 
imports from several non-targeted countries increased dramatically: imports from 
Malaysia increased by 880 %, from Indonesia by 117 %, and from Bangladesh (not 
included in the analysis) by 113 %. Overall, U.S. shrimp imports from the countries not 
targeted by the anti-dumping petition rose from 290 million pounds in 2003 to 429 
million pounds in 2004, an increase of 48 %. 
Countervailing duty investigation has different trade flow influences from AD 
investigation. It does have significant impact on newly named countries (i.e., Indonesia 
and Malaysia), with their demands decreased by 2.18% and 3.44%, respectively. CVD 
investigation does not affect all other countries, except India, albeit contrary to 
expectations. The India shrimp import is expected to decline but actually increased by 
6.61%. This interesting result shows that imports from named country, which are already 
subject to ADD, does not slow down due to the CVD investigation. That is because the 
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probability of double remedies is quite low given previous WTO cases (Durling and 
Prusa, 2012).  
Coefficients on U.S. imposition of antidumping measures against imported 
shrimp are only statistically significant for China and Thailand, though their directions 
differed. As expected, antidumping duties have a trade destruction effect for China. On 
the other hand, the trade creation effect on another named-country, Thailand, is not 
anticipated. With respect to the size of the estimates, imposition of a 1% antidumping 
duty is associated with a 0.03% decrease in quantities demanded for China shrimp and a 
1.15% increase in demand for shrimp from Thailand. The non-significance of 
antidumping duties for other named countries may be due to the fact that antidumping 
duties only cover certain frozen warmwater shrimp, accounting for about 30-40% of total 
shrimp imports (the scope of this study) by volume. Antidumping duties do not seem to 
affect total shrimp imports from these countries, namely, Ecuador, India and Vietnam. 
This phenomenon reflects the way exporters respond to the anti-dumping duties. 
The Department of Commerce imposed the anti-dumping duties against shrimp imports 
from Brazil, China, Ecuador, India, Thailand, and Vietnam in January 2005, and total 
shrimp imports from the six named countries actually increased rather than decreased. In 
2005, shrimp imports from the six countries increased to 744 million pounds, up 4.5 % 
from the 2004 total of 712 million pounds. Imports from Thailand increased by 21% from 
292.5 million pounds in 2004 to 355.2 million pounds in 2005. In 2006, imports from the 
six jumped 14.5 % to 851 million pounds. 
 One possible reason is that in order to avoid ADD, exporters try to export more 
non-subject products. Shrimp have many species and are in many different forms of 
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preparation. The anti-dumping duties do not cover all shrimp species, nor do they cover 
all forms of processed shrimp products. In particular, value-added shrimp products, such 
as breaded shrimp and prepared shrimp meals, are exempt from the tariff. NMFS data 
show that, while shrimp producers in Brazil, India, and Vietnam found other markets for 
their shrimp (primarily Europe and Japan), Ecuador and especially China and Thailand 
shifted their production to value-added products that are exempt from the tariff. U.S. 
imports of breaded shrimp increased 169 % from 36.5 million pounds to more than 98 
million pounds in 2005, and then rose another 11% in 2006. U.S. imports of prepared 
shrimp meals increased moderately in 2005, and then jumped 40% from 184 million 
pounds in 2005 to 257 million pounds in 2006. China and Thailand now account for 93 % 
of U.S. imports of breaded shrimp and 75 % of U.S. imports of prepared shrimp meals. 
After analyzing the investigation effect and trade effects of antidumping duties, 
we can conclude that U.S. shrimp buyers have rendered the anti-dumping tariff 
ineffective as a means of protection due to switching to new exempt suppliers of frozen 
shrimp and foreign producers. 
Coefficients on import alert/refusals all have negative signs in agreement with a 
priori expectations. Imports from China and Mexico due to the trade restricting policies 
slowed down by 3.15% and 3.54%, respectively. The magnitude of the impact for 
Mexico is a little bit larger than that for China. The reason for this might be that 
importation certification withdrawal has broader influence as it is nationwide, while the 
import refusal is usually on a firm level. 
1.4.2 Demand elasticities 
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Expenditure and compensated price elasticities for imports of shrimp into U.S. are 
presented in Table 7. All expenditure elasticities are positive and all own-price elasticities 
are negative except for Ecuador and Malaysia. China, India, Thailand and Vietnam have 
high expenditure elasticities (1.89, 1.41, 1.28 and 1.59 respectively), while Indonesia and 
Mexico have low expenditure elasticities (0.45 and 0.78, respectively). These indicate 
that as the overall expenditure on shrimp increases by 1%, imports from China will 
increase as twice as much; imports from India, Thailand and Vietnam would increase by 
approximately 1.50%, while imports from Indonesia and Mexico will increase less than 
proportionately. These expenditure elasticities show that the market for imported shrimp 
tends to be concentrated on major exporting countries.  
Table 7. Expenditure and Compensated Price Elasticities of Demand for Imported Shrimp 
by Source in the U.S. 
w.r.t. 
 
                                                Elasticities of Demand For Imports From 
China  Ecuador India  Indonesia Malaysia Mexico Thailand Vietnam 
Prices of Imports 
From 
China  -0.919** 0.18 -0.083 -0.532** -0.12 0.307 0.19 0.639** 
 
(0.324) (0.220) (0.249) (0.201) (0.534) (0.288) (0.135) (0.209) 
Ecuador 0.274 -0.875** 0.458 0.438 -1.168 -1.587*** 0.088 -0.354 
 
(0.404) (0.274) (0.301) (0.242) (0.681) (0.372) (0.162) (0.203) 
India  0.759* 0.066 -0.795** -0.081 -1.194* -0.39 -0.269 -0.263 
 
(0.361) (0.230) (0.267) (0.211) (0.582) (0.317) (0.144) (0.215) 
Indonesia -3.037*** 0.291 -0.485 -0.29 2.545** 0.501 -0.244 -0.621** 
 
(0.550) (0.374) (0.421) (0.328) (0.903) (0.498) (0.221) (0.215) 
Malaysia -0.228 -0.388** 0.302* -0.102 0.072 0.258 0.115 -0.346** 
 
(0.191) (0.136) (0.140) (0.107) (0.302) (0.161) (0.074) (0.131) 
Mexico -0.276 0.109 -0.098 0.194 0.269 -0.537** -0.248** -0.206 
 
(0.187) (0.122) (0.141) (0.114) (0.315) (0.172) (0.076) (0.204) 
Thailand 0.295 0.358 -0.1 0.779* -0.162 0.193 -0.945*** -0.015 
 
(0.567) (0.356) (0.415) (0.319) (0.884) (0.504) (0.218) (0.410) 
Vietnam 1.075** -0.289 -0.309 -0.496* -1.435* -0.231 0.028 -0.435 
 
(0.362) (0.238) (0.268) (0.214) (0.583) (0.315) (0.145) (0.248) 
Expenditure 1.891*** 0.415* 1.406*** 0.448** 0.651 0.779*** 1.276*** 1.588*** 
 
(0.257) (0.168) (0.193) (0.155) (0.427) (0.232) (0.103) (0.179) 
Note. − Standard errors are calculated by the delta method (Feiveson, 1999) and in parentheses.  
***
, 
**
, and 
*
 denote the significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%. 
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The compensated price elasticities represent the substitution effect of price 
changes. The own-price elasticities for all countries are inelastic, except for Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Vietnam, which are not statistically significant. The elasticity magnitudes 
are similar to those from Jones, et al. (2008), which are smaller in absolute value. 
Thailand has the most price-elastic demand (-0.945) among them, followed by China 
with an own-price elasticity of -0.919, indicating shrimp imports from Thailand and 
China are relatively sensitive to own price changes compared to other countries. Own-
price elasticities of demand for these two countries were close to unity. It implies that the 
percentage changes in quantities demanded for Thailand or China shrimp are equal to 
those in prices, so a change in price by either country will not affect the total import 
expenditure for shrimp from that country. Ecuador, India and Mexico shrimp are less 
responsive to changes in prices (with own-price elasticities -0.88, -0.80, and -0.54, 
respectively). Demand for Mexico shrimp is the most price-inelastic (-0.54) among the 
statistically significant own-price elasticities. Specifically, in response to a 1% increase in 
price, the demand for the Mexico shrimp would decrease by only 0.54%. It is possible for 
these three countries to gain revenue by raising the prices, as demands for their shrimp 
are price-inelastic. This also implies that an increase in these countries’ shrimp prices 
would result in a less than proportionate decrease in the quantity of shrimp demanded 
from them by the United States.  
Cross-price elasticities of demand for imported shrimp in United States indicate 
various relationships between shrimp imports from the exporting sources. For instance, 
the China/Indonesia cross-price elasticity is -3.04, indicating a complimentary 
relationship, while the China/Vietnam cross-price elasticity is 1.08, reflecting a 
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substitutional relationship. As for the magnitude of responsiveness, Mexico/Vietnam has 
a cross-price elasticity of -1.59. When price of Vietnamese shrimp increase by 1%, 
imports from Mexico would decrease by 1.59%. Most of the cross-price elasticities are 
either insignificant or have small magnitudes (less than unity), showing that shrimp from 
these countries do not have a strong substitutional or complementary relationship, 
possibly due to the fact that highly aggregated data are used in this study. Thus it is not 
surprising that complementary relationships do exist between different subspecies and 
types of preparation of shrimp. For instance, in 2012, more than half (55%) of the total 
breaded frozen shrimp was provided by China; more than one third (33%) of the cold-
water peeled frozen shrimp imports are from Thailand; imports from Thailand, Indonesia, 
India, Vietnam and Ecuador accounted for 81% of the total shrimp warm-water peeled 
frozen (NMFS, 2013). 
1.5 Summary and conclusions 
 
 
This paper aims to estimate the import demand for shrimp in the United States using 
monthly data from Jan 1999 to Aug 2014. Imported shrimp are from eight different 
sources: China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Thailand, Vietnam, and rest of the 
world (ROW). Using Barten’s synthetic model selection procedure, the Rotterdam model 
is chosen to estimate demand system. Even though aggregated data are used, we still 
found statistical evidence of trade destruction and creation effects arising from AD/CVD 
investigations, contrary to the findings from Carter and Gunning‐Trant (2010). These 
effects differ by country and whether the country is already subject to trade remedy 
measures. 
Significant investigation effect and insignificant trade effects of antidumping 
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duties are found from the estimation results. We observe responses the following 
reactions to the antidumping ruling: U.S. shrimp importers switching to new suppliers of 
frozen shrimp during the investigation period; and foreign producers subject to the tariff 
are switching production to shrimp products exempt from the tariff after the imposition of 
antidumping duties. These actions have rendered the anti-dumping duties ineffective in 
deterring imports from named countries. Thus AD duties fail as a good means of 
protecting U.S. domestic shrimpers. On the other hand, some domestic industries may 
pursue the process-filing strategy and therefore initiate antidumping procedures for the 
investigation effects alone. Further studies are needed to empirically examine how trade 
remedy measures affect the industry of the subject product in named countries, would 
producers in named country switch to non-subject production to avoid duties? 
In addition to trade remedy measures, we also find significant impact of import 
refusals due to safety and environmental issues. Failure to include those trade policy 
variables in demand analysis would lead to biased estimates. 
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Chapter 2. Cigarette Tax Pass-Through by Product Characteristics: Evidence from 
Nielsen Retail Scanner Data 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Smoking is the leading cause of preventable death and a significant contributor to health 
care costs in the United States, responsible for more than 480,000 deaths and costs of 
approximately $300 billion per year (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2015a). 
To protect the public health and reduce the burden of illness and death caused by tobacco 
use, federal, state, and local governments have taken significant steps to regulate tobacco 
sales, marketing, and use. Such efforts include, for example, the 1998 Master Settlement 
Agreement (MSA), which restricts the advertising, marketing and promotion of tobacco 
products and requires that participating manufacturers make annual payments to the 
settling states in perpetuity for recovery of their tobacco-related health care costs
8
; an 
increase in federal tax rate for cigarettes from $0.39 to $1.01 per pack since April 2009
9
 
(Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau 2012); passage of the Family Smoking 
Prevention and Tobacco Control Act on June 22, 2009, which gives the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) the authority to regulate the manufacture, distribution, and 
marketing of tobacco products and ban cigarettes with characterizing flavors such as fruit 
and candy (with a special exception for menthol cigarettes); enforcement of the Prevent 
All Cigarette Trafficking Act on June 29, 2010, which aims to fight crime and increase 
                                                        
8 All payments are based primarily on the number of cigarettes sold. States are about to receive $250 billion 
over the first twenty-five years of the agreement, including payments to the four states (Mississippi, Florida, 
Texas and Minnesota) that settled previously. For analysis of the effects of the MSA payment see articles: 
Sloan, Trogdon, and Mathews (2005); Trogdon and Sloan (2006); Ciliberto and Kuminoff (2010); and 
Lillard and Sfekas (2013). 
9 Via the Children's Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009. 
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government revenues by ensuring the collection of federal, state and local tobacco taxes 
on cigarettes and smokeless tobacco sold via the Internet or other mail-order sales; and 
frequent tax rate increases by state and local governments (since 2000, 47 states, the 
District of Columbia, and several U.S. territories have implemented or passed more than 
115 cigarette tax rate increases) (Orzechowski and Walker  2014), etc. 
Among all these policies, increases in cigarette prices through increased taxes 
have been regarded as the single most effective means of reducing consumption and 
lowering the smoking rate. Numerous economic studies have documented that cigarette 
tax or price increases reduce both adult and youth smoking. It is estimated that every 10 
percent increase in the real price of cigarettes reduces overall cigarette consumption by 
approximately 3 to 5 percent and youth cigarette demand by about 7 percent (Chaloupka 
and Warner 2000; Jha and Chaloupka 2000; Ross and Chaloupka 2003; Chaloupka, Straif, 
and Leon 2010; CDC 2012; Nikaj and Chaloupka 2013; Callison, and Kaestner 2014). 
Taxes make up a substantial portion of the retail cigarette price. Federal and state excise 
taxes on average accounted for 44.3 percent of the retail price of cigarettes in 2012. In 
addition, cigarette sales are subject to local excise taxes in some counties and cities. In 
2011 and 2012, more than 590 counties and cities in 7 states (Alabama, Alaska, Illinois, 
Missouri, New York, Ohio and Virginia) levied local tobacco taxes. Average local excise 
taxes were $0.030 and $0.031 per pack, respectively, in 2011 and 2012 (Orzechowski and 
Walkeron 2012; 2014). The extent to which taxes are passed through to retail prices, 
however, depends on the sellers’ pricing strategies: specifically whether they overshift or 
undershift the tax increases. Overshifted taxes put more burdens on smokers who 
continue to smoke after the tax increase but are also more effective in reducing tobacco 
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use compared with undershifted taxes. Thus, understanding the magnitude of tax 
incidence is important for tobacco control policy.  
The recent studies on cigarette tax incidence can be categorized into two strands 
based on the types of research questions posed. The first strand typically uses survey data 
and focuses on tax pass-through and smoker heterogeneities. For example, smokers can 
be classified as heavy smokers, and light and intermittent smokers (LITS), or those who 
use price-minimizing strategies versus those who do not. DeCicca, Kenkel, and Liu (2013) 
and Pesko, Licht and Kruger (2013) used self-reported prices from the 2003 and 2006-
2007 Current Population Survey Tobacco Use Supplements (TUS-CPS) and both found 
pass-through rates of about one. Their results also provided evidence that consumers 
avoided the tax by using price minimization strategies, such as purchasing cigarettes by 
the carton, in a nearby lower tax jurisdiction, or online. Goldin and Homonoff (2013) 
used data obtained from the Tax Burden on Tobacco 2008 report and found that excise 
tax was fully passed on to consumers with a pass-through rate of 1.126. They also 
investigated the link between the salience of a tax and the distribution of its burden across 
consumers by focusing on the heterogeneity in consumer attentiveness to posted (excise 
tax) and registers taxes (sales tax rate). Using data on cigarette consumption between 
1984 and 2000, they found that both high- and low-income consumers responded to 
changes in the cigarette excise tax, but that only low-income consumers responded to 
changes in the sales tax rate (added at the register) on cigarettes. Xu, Malarcher, and 
Kruger (2014) employed data from the 2009–10 National Adult Tobacco Survey (NATS) 
and found that the magnitude of cigarette tax effect on retail price depends on smokers’ 
price-minimizing strategies such as carton purchase, coupon use, purchase from Indian 
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reservations and purchase of generic brands. Excise tax was undershifted to some 
smokers who used price-minimizing strategies with a pass-through rate ranging from 30 
percent to 83 percent, while excise tax was overshifted to smokers of premium brands 
who purchased by pack outside Indian reservations with pass-through rates from 1.07 to 
1.10. 
The second strand of research explores the relationships between cigarette taxes 
incidence and retail prices differentiated by product characteristics. They mainly use 
micro-level price data from retail stores. Sullivan and Dutkowsky (2012) used tax data 
from 443 municipalities and market-level cigarette price data covering from 1990 to 
2004. Their results demonstrated overshifting of federal, state, and local excise taxes, and 
they did not find any significant difference in the magnitude of tax incidence between 
premium and generic cigarette brands. Harding, Leibtag, and Lovenheim (2012) used the 
Nielsen Homescan panel data from January 1, 2006, through December 31, 2007, and 
found that cigarette taxes were less than fully passed through (86–90% pass-through rate) 
to consumer prices on average, suggesting that consumers and producers split the burden 
of these taxes. Espinosa and Evans (2012) found that retail prices increased dollar-for-
dollar with excise tax changes by using 2001–2006 monthly retail scanner data for 
supermarkets in 29 states. Their estimation results demonstrated that smokers paid the 
entire tax burden of higher excise taxes with an almost complete pass through (99% pass-
through rate). While there was limited evidence of tax-induced brand substitution toward 
name brands from generic brands, they found some evidence for a sizable substitution 
away from carton to pack sales, suggesting that tax hikes encourage within-brand 
changes in purchase but little between-brand substitution. Chiou and Muehlegger (2014) 
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studied how consumers adapted to cigarette tax increases in the short- and long-term by 
using store-level scanner data for 85 supermarkets in the Chicago metropolitan area from 
1989 to 1996. They considered four cigarette classes (branded vs. discount, pack vs. 
carton) and found that tax incidence varied across each class of cigarette: Pass-through 
rates for premium packs and cartons were lower than discount packs and cartons, 
indicating possible substitution toward high-tier cigarettes. Brock, et al. (2015) 
investigated the impact of a cigarette excise tax hike by the state of Minnesota in 2013. 
They used data on retail prices of four specific cigarette products in 61 convenience 
stores in Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota and Wisconsin between May 2013 and 
January 2014. They found that the market overshifted the cigarette tax increase to 
consumers in Minnesota.  
We use Nielsen store-level scanner data on cigarette prices from convenience 
stores over the period 2011–2012 to measure the incidence of cigarette excise taxes. Our 
study contributes to the literature in the following ways. We use store-level sales data for 
1,865 convenience stores in 560 counties from the 48 contiguous states, utilizing 20 
million observations at the Universal Product Code (UPC)-store-week level. Because the 
data provide detailed product descriptions for each good at the UPC level, we are able to 
control for price variations using observed product characteristics and also examine how 
tax incidence interacts with product heterogeneity. Existing studies using scanner data 
typically have access to data that is either limited to a specific region or from chain 
supermarkets and drug stores, which account for a minority of cigarette sales (Espinosa 
and Evans 2012; Chiou and Muehlegger 2014). We use convenience store retail sales 
data because a majority of sales of cigarette products occur in convenience stores. 
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Nielsen's convenience store sample represents all convenience store types and includes 
chain stores, non-chain and independent convenience stores, and convenience stores 
found in gas stations. Per Nielsen and IRI, convenience stores have accounted for the 
majority of retail cigarettes sales (86.9% compared with 6.7% and 6.4% in grocery and 
drug stores, respectively, in 2014). Study by Harding, Leibtag, and Lovenheim (2012) is 
the most comparable one to ours to date. They use Nielsen Homescan data whose 
credibility is often questioned since the data are self-recorded and the recording process 
is time-consuming. Recent studies by Einav, Leibtag, and Nevo (2008 and 2010) find 
price is the most poorly recorded variable in the Homescan data. They find that recording 
discrepancies between Homescan and retailer prices are evident and potentially impact 
results. Such differences are mainly due to standard recording errors and Nielsen price 
imputation. Thus using Homescan price data may lead to biased estimation results. 
Utilizing information on cigarette products attributes, we examine whether tax incidence 
varies by product characteristics, especially by brand and package size.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II presents the empirical 
methodology for cigarette excise tax incidence. Section III describes the data and variable 
construction. Section IV discusses the estimation procedure and empirical results, and 
Section V concludes with a discussion and summary of our findings. 
 
2.2 Theoretical model 
 
 
We first consider the tax incidence
10
 using the partial equilibrium model of competitive 
                                                        
10  Here we only consider the incidence of excise tax, sales tax (ad valorem) is not 
discussed.   
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markets, which is the main thrust of the literature in studying the effects of taxes 
(Kotlikoff and Summers, 1987; Marion and Muehlegger, 2011; Weyl, & Fabinger, 2013). 
One important assumption is that the excise tax on cigarette manufactures does not shift 
backwards to laborers in the form of lower wages,  and it only forward to consumers 
in the form of higher price. For partial equilibrium analysis to be appropriate, it is 
necessary that the product in question have a market that is small relative to the entire 
economy. We then extend our analysis of tax incidence to imperfect competition with 
monopolistic and oligopolistic firms (Fullerton and Metcalf, 2002; Sullivan and 
Dutkowsky, 2012; Weyl and Fabinger, 2013) 
Perfect competitive market 
The analysis is depicted in Figure 1.1. In the absence of taxation, equilibrium is 
attained where supply equals demand and the equation, 
QD ( PD ) = QS ( PS )                                                 (A 1.1) 
The imposition of the cigarette excise tax (per-unit t), which is paid by 
suppliers, introduces a “wedge” between the price consumers pay (PD) and what 
suppliers receive (PS). Under perfect competition, both consumers and producers take 
prices as given and choose quantities as to maximize their utility and profit, 
respectively. 
The new equilibrium will satisfy the condition that, 
QD (PD + t) = QS (PS)                                            (A 1.2) 
Taking total differentiation of the market equilibrium conditions yields equations 
expressed in terms of infinitesimal (infinitely small) changes. 
dQD = dQS or DPdPD= SP dPS                                              (A 1.3) 
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where DP and SP are the price derivatives of the demand and supply functions, 
respectively, i.e. DP = 𝜕QD/𝜕PD and SP = 𝜕QS/𝜕PS. 
As PD -PS = t or dPD - dPS = dt, substitute into (1.3) to solve for the effect of the 
tax on PD: 
DPdPD=SP (dPD - dt ) 
dPD
dt
=
SP
SP−DP
                                                                               (A 1.4) 
By multiplying 
PS
QS
 , the standard representation of incidence is obtained:  
dPD
dt
=
SP
SP−DP
=
∂QS
∂PS
∂QS
∂PS
−
∂QD
∂PD
=
∂QS
∂PS
.
PS
QS
(
∂QS
∂PS
−
∂QD
∂PD
).
PS
QS
=
eS
eS−eD
=
1
1−
eD
eS
                     (A 1.5) 
where eS and eD represent the price elasticities of supply and demand, both at old 
equilibrium points before tax imposition. Because eS  ≥ 0and eD ≤ 0, we can easily get 
dPD
dt
≥ 0, that is, the firm passes on at least some of the tax to the final price of the good. 
The principle illustrated in Equation shows that the pass-through rate is determined by 
the relative elasticity of supply and demand. 
The extent to which consumers or producers pay the tax depends on the price 
elasticities of demand and supply. If eD = 0  (demand is perfectly inelastic) or eD =
−∞(supply is perfectly elastici), then 
dPD
dt
= 1 and the per-unit tax is completely paid by 
consumers. Conversely, if eD = −∞ (demand is perfectly elastic) or eS = 0(supply is 
perfectly inelastic), then 
dPD
dt
= 0, then the entire excise tax will be borne by suppliers. 
more generally, taxes are borne by those who can not easily adjust. The greater 
consumers’ abilities to substitute other commodities for the taxed commodity, the greater 
their ability to shift taxes. 
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Monopoly  
Given an excise tax increase, a monopoly’s profit can be written as: 
𝜋𝑚 = [ 𝑃𝑚 − 𝑡] Q𝑚 − 𝑐Q𝑚                         
                        =   𝑃𝑚 Q𝑚 − (𝑐 + 𝑡)Q𝑚                                               (A 2.1) 
As excise tax is a unit tax, it can be treated as an increase in marginal cost. To 
maximize profits, a monopoly choses output level at which marginal revenue is equal to 
marginal cost: MR=MC<  𝑃𝑚, where MC= 𝑐 + 𝑡.  
i.e. the first order condition for monopoly, given by: 
  𝑃𝑚 +
𝑑𝑃𝑚
𝑑Q𝑚
Q𝑚 = 𝑐 + 𝑡                                                           (A 2.2) 
This condition implies that the gap between a price of a firm’s output and its 
marginal cost is inversely related to the price elasticity of the demand curve faced by the 
firm, i.e. 
𝑃𝑚−(𝑐+𝑡)
𝑃𝑚
= −
1
𝑒𝐷
.  
Differentiating Equation (A 2.2) with respect to t: 
𝑑𝑃𝑚
𝑑Q𝑚
𝑑Q𝑚
𝑑t
+
𝑑𝑃𝑚
𝑑2Q𝑚
𝑑Q𝑚
𝑑t
Q𝑚 +
𝑑𝑃𝑚
𝑑Q𝑚
𝑑Q𝑚
𝑑t
=
𝑑c
𝑑Q𝑚
𝑑Q𝑚
𝑑t
+ 1    (A 2.3) 
Make some arrangement, we get : 
dP𝑚
dt
=
1
1+
𝑑𝑃𝑚
𝑑Q𝑚
Q𝑚+(1−
𝑑c
𝑑2Q𝑚
𝑑𝑃𝑚
𝑑Q𝑚
)
                                       (A 2.4) 
The above expression for pass-through may be further simplified: 
dP𝑚
dt
=
1
1+𝜂+𝑘
                                     (A 2.5) 
where =
𝑑𝑃𝑚
𝑑Q𝑚
Q𝑚 is the elasticity of the slope of the inverse demand function and 
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k  = 1 − 
𝑑c
𝑑2Q𝑚
𝑑𝑃𝑚
𝑑Q𝑚
, measures the relative slopes of the demand and marginal cost curves. 
A monopolist can shift more than 100% of an excise tax (t) when 1/ 1 + + 𝑘 
>1, or −1 < + 𝑘  <0. With linear costs, overshifting occurs when −2 <  <−1. 
Overshifting cannot occur in the simple case of linear demand and linear costs (   = 0 and 
k  = 1). If demand is of the constant elasticity type, and costs are linear, then overshifting 
will always occur in the monopoly model. 
Similarly, we could extend the monopoly model to a the Cournot–Nash oligopoly 
model in which identical firms compete by choosing levels of output conditional on their 
expectations of their competitors’ output levels. To simplify matters, we will assume 
there are fixed N firms in the market, which are identical and that the equilibrium is 
symmetric. 
dP𝑚
dt
=
𝑁
𝑁+𝜂+𝑘
                                      (A 2.6) 
Now, the degree of forward shifting of the unit tax on output depends on the 
elasticity of the slope of the inverse demand function ( ), the number of firms (N), and 
the relative slopes of the marginal cost and inverse demand functions (k). Overshifting 
occurs when the producer price rises by more than the excise tax
11
. 
 
2.3 Empirical model 
 
 
Following the literature, the pass-through equation is identified through a 
                                                        
11 See more models on oligopoly with differentiated products in Fullerton and Metcalf 
(2002). 
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reduced-form regression of prices on excise taxes. The suggested reduced form is a 
market equilibrium price equation, which represents the outcome of the interplay of 
supply and demand in a cigarette market. Apart from taxes, other exogenous determinants 
of demand and cost conditions are included as right-hand-side variables. One advantage 
of the reduced form is that it contains all the variables in the model but does not need to 
specify the underlying structural relationships.  
Specifically, we estimate cigarette tax incidence by assuming that the cigarette 
price is a function of the relevant state excise tax, product attributes, county economic, 
social and demographic controls, and county and time fixed effects: 
        (1)       𝑃𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡
= 𝛽1𝜏𝑗𝑡 +   𝜷𝟐(𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑 + 𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑜𝑛 + 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ + 𝑆𝑡𝑦𝑙𝑒 + 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒)𝑢
+ 𝜷𝟑𝑿𝒋𝒕 
+ 𝑗 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡  
where 𝑃𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡  is the monthly average tax inclusive cigarette price per pack paid for UPC u 
in store i located in county j at time t, 𝛽′𝑠 are coefficients to be estimated where bold 
denotes vector, tax inclusive price includes federal, state and local excise taxes. 𝜏𝑗𝑡 is the 
state excise tax on cigarette per pack in county j. The coefficient of interest, 𝛽1 , 
represents the pass-through rate of excise tax, which measures how much of the tax is 
passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices. We include a set of attribute 
variables for each product at the UPC level u: type, style, strength, brand, and carton (see 
the data section for an explanation of these categories). 𝑿𝒊𝒕 is a vector of county-level 
demand shifters which include demographic and economic variables (percentage of male, 
black, Asian, Hispanic populations; per capita income; unemployment rate; and 
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percentages of high school graduates and college graduates, respectively). 
We include county fixed effects ( 𝑗) to account for unobservable time-invariant 
price differences across counties. We also include time effects (𝛿𝑡) (calendar month and 
year), capturing time trends in smoking demand as well as yearly shocks to national 
cigarette consumption, such as national antismoking campaigns, smoking bans, and 
seasonal or monthly patterns in cigarette demand. They can also account for the annually 
adjusted escrow taxes (from the Master Settlement Agreement Payment), which are 
imposed as a unit tax and uniformly across states
12
.  The 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡  term is independently and 
identically distributed error term with zero mean and variance 𝜎2. Although our unit of 
observation is at the store-month level, most of the independent variables vary at the 
county level; within a county, there is little independent variation between stores. For 
estimates of Equation (1), we therefore cluster our standard errors at the county level to 
account for correlated error terms by county over time. 
In addition to the basic model specified in Equation (1), we also test for 
heterogeneous effects based on store locations. First, following Chiou and Muehlegger 
(2014), we include the inverse-distance weighted tax differential to the neighboring state 
divided by the distance to the state as a proxy for the incentive to cross border. We also 
add a dummy variable that indicates whether the store is located in a higher-tax state 
compared to its closest neighboring state as well as its interaction with the home state 
excise tax. The model becomes: 
(2)   𝑃𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽1𝜏𝑗𝑡 + 𝜷𝟐(𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑 + 𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑜𝑛 + 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ + 𝑆𝑡𝑦𝑙𝑒 + 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒)𝑢 +
                                                        
12
 Lillard and Sfekas (2013) conduct several simple analyses of cigarette tax incidence and find pass-
through rates are different for specifications with and without the escrow tax. The results of the model with 
year fixed effects are the same regardless of whether the escrow tax is included or excluded (the tax is 
uniform across all states and therefore can be taken care of by the fixed effects). Thus, failing to (include 
escrow tax) add time fixed effects to the model will lead to biased point estimates of the tax coefficient.  
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𝜷𝟑𝑿𝒋𝒕 + 𝛽4(𝜏𝑗𝑡 − 𝜏𝑛𝑡)/𝑑𝑗𝑛 + 𝛽5𝐻𝑇𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐻𝑇𝑗𝑡 ∗ 𝜏𝑗𝑡 + 𝑗 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡  
where n denotes the closest county in the closest state to county j, 𝜏𝑛𝑡 is the excise tax for 
the state where county n is located, (𝜏𝑗𝑡 − 𝜏𝑛𝑡) is the tax difference between the two 
states, 𝑑𝑗𝑛  is the distance between the centroids of counties j and n, 𝐻𝑇𝑗𝑡  is a dummy 
variable that takes on the value of one if 𝜏𝑗𝑡 − 𝜏𝑛𝑡 > 0, and all other variables are as 
previously defined. For stores located in a higher tax state, closest state has a lower tax 
(𝜏𝑗𝑡 − 𝜏𝑛𝑡 > 0) , there exists a cross-state avoidance opportunity, which should be 
discounted by the distance representing potential transportation costs (fuel costs, travel 
time, toll prices, etc.). The larger the ratio (𝜏𝑗𝑡 − 𝜏𝑛𝑡)/𝑑𝑗𝑛 is and the higher the incentive 
for cross-border shopping is, the lower the willingness to pay for cigarettes in the home 
state (assuming retail prices reflect consumer’s willingness to pay for a product). But, if a 
store is located in a state that has a lower tax than its closest neighbor (𝜏𝑗𝑡 − 𝜏𝑛𝑡 < 0), 
retail prices should be higher with the availabilities of tax avoidance opportunities for 
consumers in neighboring states. Thus, we expect a negative sign for 𝛽4. Equation (2) 
allows the price (and the tax pass-through) to depend on the inverse distance weighted tax 
difference between the home and closest state. The effect of the tax difference on the 
incidence of state cigarette taxes becomes smaller as the distance increases. 
Second, previous studies found a significant association between one state's tax 
system and its neighboring states' tax systems (Egger, Pfaffermayr, and Winner 2005; 
Agrawal 2013, 2014, and 2015), which raises the possibility that state tax rates could be 
endogenously determined. In line with the spatial tax competition models, a general 
specification for a spatial econometric model can be written as:  
          (3)             𝜏𝑗𝑡 = 𝜌 ∑ 𝑤𝑗𝑛
𝑁
𝑛=1 𝜏𝑛𝑡 + 𝑠 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑢𝑗𝑡           
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where 𝑤𝑗𝑛 is the (j, n)th element of a contiguity spatial-weighting matrix W associated to 
the endogenous spatial lag. In a contiguity matrix, contiguous units (also known as 
neighbors) are assigned weights of 1, and noncontiguous units are assigned weights of 0.  
Using geospatial data from 2010 Census TIGER/Line Shapefiles, which contain 
boundary and polygon information of each state in a coordinate dataset to identify its 
neighbors, we construct a row-normalized contiguity weight matrix by the Stata 
command spmat. With row-normalized contiguity weights, each neighbor is given equal 
weight. As an example, consider the state of Illinois, which has six neighbors. The 
weights given to Indiana, Kentucky, Wisconsin, Missouri, Iowa, and Michigan would be 
1/6 each; all other states are given zero weight (Drukker, et al. 2013)
13
. 
The  ∑ 𝑤𝑗𝑛
𝑁
𝑛=1 𝜏𝑛𝑡 term is the spatial lag of 𝜏𝑗𝑡. The 𝜌 term is the unknown spatial 
autoregressive parameter to be estimated. State fixed effects ( 𝑠) and time (year/month) 
dummies (𝛿𝑡) are also included. 𝑢𝑗𝑡 is the error term. We fit Equations (1) and (3) by 
using the three-stage least squares (3SLS) estimator, which is an instrumental variable 
(IV) technique for a system of simultaneous equations.  
 
2.4 Variable construction and data 
 
In this section, we discuss the construction of variables for estimation as well as the 
sources of our data. Table 8 summarizes variable descriptions and summary statistics. 
 
                                                        
13
 The normalized matrix W  = (wjn) is computed from the underlying matrix ?̃? = (?̃?jn), where the elements 
are assumed to be nonnegative; In a row-normalized matrix, each element in row j is divided by the sum of 
row j ’s elements: the (j, n)th element of  W becomes wjn = ?̃?jn/rj,  where rj  is the sum of the jth row of ?̃?. 
After row normalization, each row of W will sum to 1.  
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Table 8. Summary Statistics 
Variable description Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Excise tax inclusive price of cigarette (per 20-pack) $5.752 1.467 $2.359 $20 
State excise tax rate on cigarette  $1.549 1.049 $0.170 $4.350 
Product attributes 
Type (=0 regular, =1 menthol, menthol variants (menthol gold, menthol 
blue, etc.) and other flavors (bold taste fresh, etc.)) 
0.373 0.483 0 1 
Style (=0 filtered, =1 non-filtered) 0.028 0.164 0 1 
StrengthL (=1 light, =0 all others) 0.320 0.466 0 1 
StrengthU (=1 ultra light, =0 all others) 0.104 0.306 0 1 
SrengthR (=1 regular, =0 all others) 0.576 0.494 0 1 
Carton (=1 carton, =0 single pack) 0.189 0.391 0 1 
Premium (=1 premium brand, =0 discount brand) 0.749 0.436 0 1 
Economic variables 
Per capita personal income, annual ($1,000) 42.755 9.963 21.403 121.459 
Monthly unemployment rate 7.706 2.349 0.800 22.600 
 
Price and Product Characteristics Data 
We use the Nielsen ScanTrack retail scanner data from January 1, 2011, through 
December 31, 2012, which cover a total of about 20 million weekly transactions made in 
1,865 convenience stores throughout the 48 contiguous states (Alaska, Hawaii, and the 
District of Columbia not included). Each transaction is identified using a unique UPC, a 
12-digit barcode scanned by the retailer at the point of purchase. The data were obtained 
through the James M. Kilts Center for Marketing at Chicago Booth. We aggregate the 
Demographic variables 
Percentage of male population 0.493 0.012 0.466 0.603 
Percentage of female population 0.507 0.012 0.399 0.534 
Percentage of white population 0.858 0.113 0.191 0.987 
Percentage of black population 0.082 0.102 0.001 0.734 
Percentage of American Indian and Alaska Native population 0.013 0.035 0.000 0.768 
Percentage of Asian population 0.026 0.027 0.001 0.186 
Percentage of Hispanic  0.112 0.133 0.004 0.955 
Percentage of Non-Hispanic 0.888 0.133 0.045 0.996 
Percentage of population in age group <15 years old 0.193 0.027 0.067 0.308 
Percentage of population in age group 15-24 years 0.140 0.032 0.050 0.334 
Percentage of population in age group 25-44 years 0.252 0.030 0.135 0.369 
Percentage of population in age group 45–64 years 0.272 0.029 0.146 0.401 
Percentage of population in age group 65 years and older 0.143 0.041 0.059 0.492 
Percent of adults with less than a high school diploma 0.125 0.053 0.031 0.382 
Percent of adults with a high school diploma only 0.303 0.062 0.124 0.515 
Percent of adults completing some college or associate's degree, 
bachelor's degree or higher 
0.571 0.089 0.265 0.815 
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data to monthly by location (store) and product (UPC). This aggregation leads to more 
than 6 million observations. Price of each observation is a monthly average price for a 
product with a particular UPC sold in a particular store. As almost all of the tax changes 
during our period of analysis occurred from the first day of a month (see below), monthly 
aggregates mean all months contain data either from before or after tax changes (there is 
one exception: Illinois increased its tax at the end of June 2012, so we assume the tax 
change started from July 1st). 
One of the major advantages of our data is that we observe the UPC code of each 
product purchased. Each UPC represents a unique cigarette product with some 
characteristics, such as flavor type (regular, menthol and menthol variants), style (filtered 
or non-filtered), strength (regular, light, or ultra light), brand (premium or discount), and 
package (carton or pack). This categorization allows us to construct product attribute 
variables and explicitly incorporate them into the model rather than simply using the 
UPC fixed effects. In addition, we use the brand information in Nielsen data to group 
brands into premium and discount cigarettes following the industry brand categorization 
used in Cornelius, et al. (2013). By definition, a premium (or name-brand) product (such 
as Marlboro, Newport, and Camel) is perceived to have a higher value than one that is 
merely marketed as a discount (or generic/economy) brand product (such as Basic, Doral, 
Tahoe, Malibu, and USA Gold) (see the Appendix for detailed brand classifications). As 
for the package, we restricted our attention to cigarettes sold either as part of twenty-
cigarette packs or as cartons (i.e., ten packs of twenty cigarettes per pack), eliminating 
promotional packages containing only two, three, or five packs. Multipacks usually have 
special price promotion offers, such as manufacturers’ “buy one get one free” promotions 
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for two packs. These restrictions eliminated fewer than 2 percent of cigarette sales in our 
sample. In our final dataset, 81.1 percent of the cigarettes are sold in pack versus 18.9 
percent sold in cartons. Considering both package and brand, premium packs account for 
the majority of the cigarettes (60.6%), followed by discount packs (20.5%). Premium and 
discount brands sold in carton constitute the rest at 13.8 percent and 5.1 percent, 
respectively. Premium pack cigarettes sell for slightly higher with an average price at 
$6.13, 64 cents more than the discount pack at $5.49. This price difference becomes more 
pronounced for cigarettes sold in cartons: the average premium carton is sold at $100.19, 
15.6 percent more expensive than discount carton cigarettes (at $ 86.66) (see Table 9). 
Table 9. Average Consumer Price and Percentage by Characteristics of Cigarette Tiers 
 
Tax Data 
The federal excise tax for cigarette has been $1.007 per pack of twenty cigarettes, 
effective April 1, 2009 (Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau 2012). State excise 
tax data and information about general sales tax application to cigarettes were obtained 
from the Tax Burden on Tobacco 2014 report published by Orzechowski and Walkeron, 
Brand  Premium Discount 
Average price $5.92 $5.26 
Share (%) 74.42 25.58 
Package Pack Carton (10 packs) 
Average price  $5.97 $4.83 (per pack) 
Share (%) 81.11 18.89 
Brand and package 
Premium 
Packs 
Premium 
Cartons 
Discount 
Packs 
Discount 
Cartons 
Average price  
$6.13  $5.01 
(per pack) 
 $5.49  $4.33 
(per pack) 
 
Share (%) 60.64  13.77  20.47  5.12  
Type Regular Menthol, menthol variants and other flavors  
Average price $5.68 $5.87 
Share (%) 62.75 37.25 
Style      Filtered Non-filtered 
Average price  $5.73 $6.58 
Share (%) 97.22 2.78 
Strength Regular Light Ultra Light 
Average price  $5.65 $5.83 $6.06 
Share (%) 57.55 32 10.45 
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Tax Foundation (2014), and state revenue departments. The mean state excise tax rate 
was $1.55 per pack (Table 8). Considerable variation exists in cigarette excise tax rates 
across states. For the years 2011 and 2012, New York State had the highest state cigarette 
excise tax in the United States at $4.35 per pack, while Missouri had the lowest at $0.17 
per pack. During the period from 2011 to 2012, four states increased the excise tax on 
cigarettes: Connecticut increased excise tax by $0.40 from $3.00 to $3.40 effective July 
1st, 2011; Vermont increased by $0.38 to $2.62 effective July 1st, 2011; Illinois 
increased its tax by $1.00 to $1.98 effective June 24, 2012; Rhode Island increased it tax 
by $0.04 to $3.50 effective July 1st, 2012. New Hampshire is the only state that 
decreased the tax (by $0.10 from $1.78 effective July 1st, 2011). This reduction was the 
first time a state decreased its cigarette excise tax since 2004 (CDC, 2012). 
Social, Economic, and Demographic Data 
We matched the Nielsen data with economic, demographic and geographic data 
for each county. The monthly unemployment rate by county was from Local Area 
Unemployment database, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Annual county population 
estimates by age, sex, race, and Hispanic origin data was from County Characteristics 
Resident Population Estimates, U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division, released June 
2014. Annual per capita personal income was from the Local Area Personal Income and 
Employment dataset, Bureau of Economic Analysis. Education data is a 5-year average 
of 2009-2013 from the Census Bureau's American Community Survey, available in 
County-level Data Sets, ERS, USDA. 
Geographic Data 
Coordinates information of the centroid of the census tract for each county, was 
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retrieved from the National Counties Gazetteer File, 2014 Census Gazetteer Files, U.S. 
Census Bureau. We calculated the crow-flies distance (or the “Great Circle” distance in 
miles) from the centroid of the county where a store is located to the closest county that is 
in another state. The average distance is 82 miles. 
 
2.5 Empirical results 
 
Table 10 presents our estimates of equations (1), (2) and (3) using both OLS and 3SLS 
estimators. Columns (1) - (6) are results of OLS estimates while column (7) shows results 
for 3SLS estimates.  Each column of the table contains estimates from a separate 
regression that adds time and county fixed effects, product attributes, social, economic 
and demographic controls sequentially across columns in order to examine the sensitivity 
of our estimates to the inclusion of different sets of controls. 
Table 10. Estimates of the Effect of Cigarette Excise Taxes on Consumer Prices 
Independent variables 
Dependent variable: Tax inclusive cigarette price per pack 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
State excise tax 1.116*** 1.113*** 1.096*** 1.065*** 1.051*** 1.194*** 1.051*** 
 
(0.025) (0.025) (0.045) (0.043) (0.020) (0.037) (0.000) 
Higher-tax state      0.220***  
      (0.063)  
Higher-tax state* State 
excise tax 
     -0.177***  
     (0.046)  
Tax difference (inverse 
distance weighted) 
     
-1.835 
 
     
(1.152) 
 
Style 
   
0.628*** 0.610*** 0.610*** 0.609*** 
    
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.002) 
Type 
   
0.058*** 0.048*** 0.049*** 0.048*** 
    
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.001) 
Strength light 
   
0.304*** 0.307*** 0.306*** 0.307*** 
    
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) 
Strength ultra light 
   
0.448*** 0.465*** 0.464*** 0.465*** 
    
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.001) 
Carton 
   
-0.415*** -0.498*** -0.487*** -0.498*** 
    
(0.043) (0.040) (0.040) (0.001) 
Continued 
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Table 10. Continued  
Independent variables 
Dependent variable: Tax inclusive cigarette price per pack 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Premium brand 
   
0.791*** 0.772*** 0.776*** 0.772*** 
    
(0.019) (0.017) (0.018) (0.001) 
Unemployment rate 
    
-0.041*** -0.048*** -0.041*** 
     
(0.008) (0.007) (0.000) 
Per capita income 
    
0.006*** 0.002 0.006*** 
($1,000) 
    
(0.002) (0.002) (0.000) 
High school grads 
    
-0.207 -0.327 -0.209*** 
     
(0.993) (0.602) (0.015) 
College degree and 
    
0.215 0.307 0.214*** 
higher 
    
(0.713) (0.376) (0.010) 
Male population 
    
-3.598*** -1.518 -3.594*** 
     
(1.380) (1.238) (0.027) 
Black 
    
-0.767*** -0.628*** -0.767*** 
     
(0.202) (0.146) (0.004) 
AIAN 
    
0.780** 0.698* 0.779*** 
     
(0.377) (0.370) (0.009) 
Asian 
    
0.045 0.123 0.045*** 
     
(0.894) (0.702) (0.016) 
Hispanic 
    
-0.303 -0.476** -0.304*** 
     
(0.267) (0.209) (0.004) 
Age 15-24 
    
0.566 -0.275 0.559*** 
     
(1.094) (0.969) (0.019) 
Age 25-44 
    
0.940 0.654 0.938*** 
     
(1.696) (1.498) (0.029) 
Age 45-64 
    
-0.551 -1.802 -0.561*** 
     
(1.122) (1.097) (0.022) 
Age 65 + 
    
0.825 0.819 0.824*** 
     
(1.045) (0.904) (0.018) 
Constant 4.023*** 3.993*** 4.016*** 3.374*** 5.065*** 0.610*** 5.069*** 
 
(0.044) (0.039) (0.068) (0.067) (1.146) (0.014) (0.022) 
Month fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County fixed effects No No Yes Yes No No No 
Product attributes No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Economic, social and 
demographic controls 
No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.637 0.643 0.706 0.786 0.745 0.751 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the county level are in parentheses.  
***
 Significant at 1%, 
**
 Significant at 5%, 
*
 Significant at 10%.  
Observations for Columns (1)-(3) are 6,596,906; while sample sizes reduce to 6,587,905 for 
Columns (4)-(7), due to the fact that there're 9,001 observations that have missing product 
attributes. 
 
 
Columns (1) - (5) contain the results of estimates of Equation (1). In column (1), 
we only included state excise tax as a regressor. We found overshifting of taxes to 
consumer prices: A one-cent increase in taxes is associated with a 1.12-cent increase in 
price (per pack). In column (2), we added time fixed effects, which absorbed some of the 
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tax variations and slightly reduced the estimated pass-through rate. Column (3) shows the 
results of incidence when both county and time fixed effects were included, which is a 
model widely used in previous comparable studies. The pass-through rate is 1.10 in this 
case. Including monthly and county effects reduced the pass-through, likely because 
factors such as seasonal production cost changes, seasonal retailer pricing and 
discounting practices, and differences in local cigarette excise taxes were largely 
accounted for. Most counties and cities do not have their own cigarette tax rates because 
state law prohibits them, but there are major exceptions. More than 600 local jurisdictions 
nationwide have their own cigarette tax rates or fees, notably New York City ($1.50 per 
pack) and Chicago-Cook County ($2.68 per pack) (Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, 
2015). Escrow tax, which is per-pack payment and uniform nationwide, is subject to 
annual adjustment. Data on local taxes and escrow taxes were not available to us.  
When product attributes were added, the pass-through rate was further reduced to 
1.07 (column 4). Product attributes explain the differences in prices, which can vary 
substantially across products with different brands, styles, packages, etc. Coefficients on 
product attribute variables have the expected signs and are all statistically significant at 
the 1 percent level. The coefficient on the dummy variable for premium brands is positive, 
and the largest effect among product attributes in the model. On average on a per-pack 
price basis, (all other attributes equal), prices for premium brands cigarettes are 79 cents 
higher than discount brand cigarettes. Similarly, unfiltered cigarettes sell for 63 cents 
more than filtered cigarettes; in terms of strength, prices for ultra light and light cigarettes 
are 45 and 30 cents higher than prices for regular ones, respectively; consumers pay 60 
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cents more for menthol or other flavored cigarettes than regular cigarettes; cigarettes sold 
in cartons are 42 cents cheaper per pack than those sold as single packs. 
Column (5) replaced the county fixed effects with county-level economic, social 
and demographic variables
14
. Controlling for county demographic and economic 
characteristics further decreased the pass-through rate to 1.05. Our results show that 
cigarette prices are lower in counties with higher percentages of male and black 
populations. These consumer groups are reported to have higher rates of smoking. 
Counties with a higher unemployment rate also have lower cigarette prices. Interestingly, 
counties that have higher percentages of American Indian have higher cigarette prices, 
likely because American Indian/Alaska Natives (AI/ANs) have a higher prevalence of 
smoking than most other racial/ethnic groups in the United States (CDC 2015b). 
Column (6) expands the specification in column (5) by incorporating inverse 
distance-weighted tax differential from neighboring states’ excise tax. At the mean of 
distance, which is 82 miles, the average tax differential effect is -0.02 (=-1.84/82), though 
not statistically significant. For stores located in the higher-tax state (𝜏𝑗𝑡 − 𝜏𝑛𝑡 > 0), the 
pass-through rate is 1.02 (1.194-0.177), while for stores located in the lower-tax state 
(𝜏𝑗𝑡 − 𝜏𝑛𝑡 < 0), the pass-through rate is 1.19.
15
 This result is consistent with previous 
studies (Hanson and Sullivan 2009; Harding, Leibtag and Lovenheim 2012; Chiou and 
Muehlegger 2014), which found pass-through rates declined for stores closer to the 
border with a lower-priced jurisdiction. As the cost of travel to low-tax county decreases, 
                                                        
14
 County education variables are five-year average, which are time-invariant during our study period. 
Thus they serve the same purpose of the county fixed effects. To avoid the multicollinearity issue, in 
column (5) we only keep the county education variables. 
15 In a similar approach, we classified counties into three categories: counties not on state borders, counties 
on the state borders with the lowest state tax compared to its neighbors, all other counties on state borders 
to see tax incidence varies across stores in different locations. The tax pass-through rates for these three 
categories are 1.14, 1.05, and 1.00, respectively.  Results are presented in Appendix Table A1. 
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demand will become more tax elastic as it becomes easier for consumers to avoid high 
taxes. This might also suggest manufacturers’/retailers’ spatial pricing strategies to 
reduce the price variability among different tax jurisdictions (Shang, et al. 2013). 
Column (7) shows the results of equations (1) and (3) using the 3SLS estimator as 
a robustness check. The tax incidence rate is 1.05, which is identical to the result from 
column (5). For the tax competition equation (3), the estimate of the impact of 
neighboring counties’ tax rates on one state’s cigarette excise tax is a quantitatively small 
but statistically significant 0.06, which is similar to previous studies (Agrawal 2014). 
This means that a one-dollar increase in neighbor's state tax rate implies a 6-cent increase 
in the own state tax rate. Therefore, taking into consideration that state taxes are 
positively correlated will make the tax pass-through rate even bigger (i.e., less room for 
tax avoidance by shopping in neighbor states).  
Overall, our estimates are very robust across specifications and we found a more 
than complete pass-through rate, which is similar to other recent estimates using 
disaggregated data (Keeler, et al. 1996; Hanson and Sullivan 2009; Sullivan and 
Dutkowsky 2012; Goldin and Homonoff 2013; Xu, Malarcher, and Kruger 2014; Brock, 
et al. 2015). This overshifting of excise tax suggests an inelastic demand for cigarettes, 
which is consistent with cigarette demand studies (Chaloupka et al. 2002; Zheng et al. 
2014). It also suggests the existence of market power and strategic behavior among firms 
from the supply side, which is supported by the facts that U.S. cigarette manufacturing is 
heavily concentrated
16
, the tax incidence theory (Fullerton and Metcalf, 2002), and 
                                                        
16
 Top three manufacturers—Philip Morris USA, R.J. Reynolds, and Lorillard—represented 84% of 
cigarettes sold in 2009. The fourth- and fifth-largest manufacturers (Commonwealth Brands and Liggett 
and Myers) together comprise approximately 7 percent of the market. Hundreds of small firms together 
account for the remaining 10 percent (GAO, 2011). According to concentration ratios data from the 2007 
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findings by previous empirical studies on cigarette market structure (Adhikari 2004; 
Raper, Love, and Shumway 2007; Sephton 2008). Nonetheless, our estimate is higher 
than the most comparable recent studies that use scanner data. Harding, Leibtag, and 
Lovenheim (2012) examined nationally representative consumer panel data of cigarette 
purchases from a broad set of retailers ranging from 2006 to 2007 and found excise taxes 
were undershifted to consumer prices; Espinosa and Evans (2012) reported evidence of a 
full pass-through rate by using scanner data from 29 states over the period of 2001-2006; 
and Chiou and Muehlegger (2014) found an 80 percent pass-through rate for cigarettes 
sold in the Chicago area from 1989 to 1996. The use of different data, focus periods, and 
estimation techniques likely explain the variability of tax incidence estimates, in addition 
to other possible factors such as structural changes in the industry and continued decline 
of the smoking rate in the United States. 
Overshifting also implies that the cigarette excise tax may induce a substitution of 
quality for quantity. The basic theory outlining the impact of excise taxes for multi-
attribute was first proposed by Barzel (1976), who argued that an increase in a per-unit 
tax could introduce a shift to higher quality products (thus more expensive products). 
This is because the price of higher-quality goods will increase by a smaller percentage 
than will the price of lower-quality goods. Barzel’s theory had supporting empirical 
evidence from Sobel and Garrett (1997), who directly tested the hypothesis by using 
market share data and found that a 3-cent excise tax leads to a 1-percentage-point 
increase in market share of premium cigarettes. We therefore investigate whether tax 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Economic Census of the United States, the top four cigarette manufacturing companies accounted for 97.8% 
of total value of shipments ($34.7 billion) for the 20 largest companies. Due to its high level of 
concentration, the cigarette manufacturing industry is often used as an example of a less than perfectly 
competitive industry. 
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pass-through rate is different for premium cigarettes versus discount cigarettes. 
Furthermore, we also examine whether tax incidence differs by package (carton vs. pack). 
The intuition behind this is that heavy smokers rely more on carton cigarettes, which may 
lead to a high pass-through rate for carton cigarettes. 
Table 11. Cigarette Excise Tax Incidence by Brand and Package 
 
Independent variables 
Dependent variable: Tax inclusive cigarette price per pack 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
State excise tax (tax) 1.035*** 1.000*** 0.982*** 0.982*** 
 (0.021) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) 
Carton*tax 0.126***  0.129***  
 (0.034)  (0.033)  
Premium*tax  0.069*** 0.071***  
  (0.014) (0.001)  
Premium*Carton*tax    0.231*** 
    (0.031) 
Discount *Carton*tax    0.072** 
    (0.032) 
Premium* Pack*tax    0.071*** 
    (0.014) 
Premium*Carton    0.056*** 
    (0.015) 
Style 0.611*** 0.607*** 0.609*** 0.612*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Type 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.051*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Strength light 0.306*** 0.305*** 0.305*** 0.304*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Strength ultra light 0.466*** 0.463*** 0.464*** 0.464*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
Carton -0.647*** -0.497*** -0.650*** -0.698*** 
 (0.069) (0.040) (0.068) (0.067) 
Premium brand 0.773*** 0.663*** 0.660*** 0.629*** 
 (0.017) (0.014) (0.001) (0.017) 
Unemployment rate -0.041*** -0.041*** -0.041*** -0.041*** 
 (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) 
Per capita income ($1,000) 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
High school grads -0.344 -0.217 -0.358 -0.364 
 (0.983) (0.996) (0.986) (0.989) 
College degree and higher 0.108 0.212 0.103 0.099 
 (0.706) (0.715) (0.708) (0.710) 
Continued  
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Table 11. Continued  
 
 
Independent variables 
Dependent variable: Tax inclusive cigarette price per pack 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Male population -3.584*** -3.599*** -3.585*** -3.587*** 
 (1.365) (1.381) (1.366) (1.367) 
Black -0.768*** -0.768*** -0.768*** -0.770*** 
 (0.199) (0.202) (0.200) (0.200) 
AIAN 0.731** 0.777** 0.728* 0.724* 
 (0.372) (0.376) (0.372) (0.371) 
Asian 0.008 0.062 0.025 0.015 
 (0.892) (0.893) (0.891) (0.893) 
Hispanic -0.350 -0.303 -0.350 -0.353 
 (0.264) (0.268) (0.265) (0.265) 
Age 15-24 0.578 0.579 0.592 0.599 
 (1.086) (1.095) (1.087) (1.088) 
Age 25-44 0.924 0.961 0.946 0.955 
 (1.690) (1.700) (1.694) (1.697) 
Age 45-64 -0.495 -0.512 -0.453 -0.445 
 (1.114) (1.124) (1.116) (1.117) 
Age 65 + 0.759 0.830 0.762 0.770 
 (1.044) (1.047) (1.046) (1.048) 
Constant 5.184*** 5.136*** 5.260*** 5.283*** 
 (1.137) (1.153) (1.144) (1.146) 
Observations -------------------------6,587,905---------------------------- 
R-squared 0.745 0.745 0.746 0.746 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the county level are in parentheses. 
***
 Significant at 1%, 
**
 Significant at 5%, 
*
 Significant at 10%. 
All regressions include county fixed effects, purchase month fixed effects, product attribute 
variables as well as the full set of economic, social, demographic controls shown in Table 10. 
 
 
Table 11 presents the separately estimated tax pass-through for each class of 
cigarette, considering four cigarette classes (premium vs. discount, pack vs. carton) by 
adding interaction terms that are the products of state excise tax with attribute dummies. 
Results in Table 11 should be compared with the general pass-through rate of 1.05 in 
column (5) of Table 10. In column (1) of Table 11, we only included an interaction term 
between carton sales and tax and found that the amount of tax pass-through for cigarettes 
sold in carton is 13 cents more than those sold by pack, given a $1 tax increase. In 
column (2), we included only an interaction term for premium brand cigarettes. 
Consumers bear 7 cents more pass-through for the premium brands than the discount 
brands, suggesting that the consumption of discount brands (likely by low-income 
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consumer) is slightly more price sensitive compared to premium brands. The difference 
between tax pass-through rates of cartons and packs is larger than the difference between 
premium and discount brands. In column (3), both interaction terms were included. An 
additional $1 tax is associated with 98 cents price increase for a pack of discount brand 
cigarette. Compared with that base, discount carton, premium pack, and premium carton 
pass-through are 13 cents, 7 cents and 20 cents higher, respectively. In column (4), we 
incorporated three-way interaction terms, which allowed tax incidence to vary across 
combinations of different package and brand types. Based on the estimates, tax pass-
through rates for all other categories are all statistically significant at the 5 percent level 
or better and larger than that of the baseline category discount pack. The tax pass-through 
rates rank is: premium carton (1.21), discount carton (1.05), premium pack (1.05), and 
discount pack (0.98)
17
. In addition, we also used Wald tests to perform pairwise 
comparisons among the non-baseline categories. Results show that the pass-through rate 
for discount carton is smaller than that of premium carton, and the rate of premium pack 
is smaller than that of premium carton, with the differences both being significant at the 1% 
significance level. 
A higher tax pass-through rate for premium brands compared with discount 
brands may suggest that consumers are more loyal to premium brands and hence are less 
sensitive to the price changes of premium brands. A possible reason for the finding of 
higher tax pass-through rate for cartons compared with packs is that carton buyers tend to 
be more addicted smokers. Our findings indicate possibilities of different demand 
                                                        
17 We also partition our sample and fit separate regressions for each product group and get slightly different 
results because the separate analysis assumes different variances.  Nonetheless, the pass-through rate 
ranking remains the same: premium carton (1.21), discount carton (1.08), premium pack (1.04), and 
discount pack (1.02). Results are presented in Appendix Table A2.  
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elasticities across product tiers and are broadly consistent with the fact that high taxation 
and MSA enforcement have reduced the pricing advantages of discount brands. 
Our results are similar to estimates from Espinosa and Evans (2012) in that they 
also found a slightly higher pass-through rate for name-brand (1.04) than generic 
cigarettes (1.01), and a higher pass-through rate for cigarettes sold in cartons (1.03) 
versus single packs (0.96). Nonetheless, they further found that given a tax hike, the 
market shares of discount brand cigarette increased, while the carton market share 
decreased, contrary to Barzel’s theory. On the other hand, Chiou and Muehlegger (2014) 
found suggestive evidence that tax rates reduced consumption of low-price cigarettes 
relative to consumption of high-price cigarettes in the long run. However, they estimated 
a reverse direction of “flight to quality” in the short run: the quantity of low-price 
cigarettes rises immediately following a tax change. They also found that premium pack 
and carton cigarettes have lower tax pass-through rates than discount pack and carton 
cigarettes. As mentioned before, the large differences in datasets (especially as their 
estimates were based only on the Chicago Metropolitan Statistical Area, where there are 
large tax avoidance opportunities, while our coverage is much broader) might contribute 
to these discrepancies.  
 
2.6 Conclusions 
 
We empirically investigated the cigarette excise tax pass-through by using Nielsen 
ScanTrack data for sales in convenience stores from January 2011 to December 2012. 
Our store-level data allow us to observe product attributes at the UPC level, which helps 
to explain variations between price tiers and improves the estimates of tax impact. We 
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linked the market data with county economic, social and demographic information, which 
were used as controls. We found that cigarette taxes were more than fully passed through 
to consumer prices, suggesting smokers bear excess burdens of excise taxes. On average, 
a $1 cigarette tax increase over shifted to consumer prices: They pay the entire amount of 
the tax as well as a premium of between 5 and 19 cents per pack of cigarettes. 
We also found that tax incidence differed by class of cigarette. Pass-through rates 
for premium brands and cartons of packaged cigarettes are higher than those for discount 
brands and cigarettes in packs, respectively, indicating possibilities of different demand 
elasticities across product tiers. Because premium brands command a higher brand 
loyalty and carton buyers tend to be heavy smokers, consumers of premium brands and 
carton-packaged cigarettes bear a higher tax burden. Such results might lead to important 
policy implications. For example, cigarette manufacturers might respond differently to a 
tax increase by package of cigarette, i.e., they undershift tax into prices for packs, while 
overshift tax into prices of cartons. Carton buyers, who are typically heavy smokers less 
likely to quit smoking, are expected to bear more economic burdens. 
As more studies begin to focus on tax incidence under imperfect competition, and 
supply chains and optimal taxation (Kopczuk, et al. 2013; Weyl and Fabinger 2013; Peitz, 
and Reisinger 2014), future research of cigarette tax incidence might explore the market 
structure of the cigarette industry and develop models for analysis of tax incidence in a 
market with geographically differentiated taxes and different levels of competition at 
each segment of the vertical supply chain.  
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Chapter 3. Who’s Buying Organic Coffee? Demographic Characteristics of 
Consumers in the United States 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
 
Consumer demand for organic products in the United States has grown by double-digits 
every year over the past two decades — and organic sales increased from $3.6 billion in 
1997 to over $39 billion in 2014 according to Organic Trade Association (OTA, 2015). 
Coffee is the largest category by far of the organic imports, valued at $333 million in 
2014 (OTA, 2015), making the United States the single largest importer of organic coffee 
in the world. The United States is a nation of coffee drinkers with only one state—
Hawaii—able to grow coffee, so most organic coffee is imported and certified under a 
foreign organic equivalency standard. 
As a household staple in the U.S., coffee is consumed across all incomes, ages, 
genders and states.  With increasing availability of sustainable coffees, such as certified 
fair trade, organic, shade grown, bird-friendly and carbon neutral, more consumers are 
interested in using their purchasing power to express their support of a broad range of 
social and environmental issues. Knowledge of price sensitivity and demographic 
profiling with respect to consumption of organic and conventional coffee is important for 
manufacturers, retailers, advertisers, nutritionists, and other stakeholders from a 
competitive intelligence and strategic decision-making perspective. 
Several studies have been performed on the U.S. demand for coffee. Most of them 
estimated the demand for regular coffee either as a sole good, or as part of the larger 
category of non-alcoholic beverages. Yen et al. (2004) estimated the demand for coffee 
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and tea using data from the National Food Stamp Program Survey, which included prices, 
incomes, and demographic information to estimate household beverage consumption in a 
translog demand system. Estimated own-price elasticities for coffee/tea were -0.470 
(compensated) and -0.890 (uncompensated), respectively. The expenditure elasticity was 
1.130. Pofahl et al. (2005) estimated a demand system for non-alcoholic beverages in 
which coffee was one category by using three types of Almost Ideal Demand System 
(AIDS) models (linear approximated AIDS, non-linear AIDS and quadratic AIDS 
(QUAIDS)) and Nielsen Homescan Panel data over the period 1998 to 2001. They found 
that coffee was price elastic, with the four-year average compensated own-price elasticity 
at -1.137; the average expenditure elasticity for coffee was 0.678. Zheng and Kaiser 
(2008) investigated impacts from cross-commodity advertising on nonalcoholic beverage 
demands in the US from 1974 to 2005. They also employed the AIDS model and 
estimated jointly for five categories of nonalcoholic beverages: fluid milk, juice, soft 
drinks, bottled water, and coffee and tea. The estimated own-price elasticities for coffee 
and tea together were: uncompensated (-0.462) and compensated (-0.083)-the lowest 
among all beverages; the expenditure elasticity was 3.144. While coffee and tea were 
price inelastic goods, they also found that coffee/tea had the highest own-advertising 
elasticity (0.138), suggesting that advertising was the most successful in enhancing 
coffee/tea demand. Dharmasena and Capp Jr. (2009) estimated the demand for at-home 
nonalcoholic beverage consumption in the United States using Nielsen Homescan panel 
data over the period January 1998 through December 2003 and the AIDS model. As a 
single category, coffee had estimated own-price elasticities of -0.464 for compensated 
and -0.517 for uncompensated. The expenditure elasticity was 0.628. Alviola et al. (2010) 
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also did a study of U.S. demand for at-home nonalcoholic beverages using the 1999 
Nielsen Homescan Panel. Both AIDS and QUAIDS models were used, results had 
expenditure elasticities of 0.974 and 0.838 for coffee, respectively. The compensated own 
price elasticities were elastic for both AIDS (-1.527) and QUAIDS (-1.487) models. 
Another strand of coffee demand research took product differentiation into 
account and relied on the stated preferences approach. Basu and Hicks (2008) 
investigated label performance and consumer willingness to pay for fair trade coffee in 
the United States and Germany. They found that in both countries respondents who chose 
generic coffee tended to ignore the organic feature of the coffee, while they show strong 
willingness to pay for Fair Trade coffee. Strzok and Huffman (2012) did experiments in 
the Ames, Iowa area, asking participants’ WTP for organic and conventional coffee, 
maple syrup and olive oil. They found that participants were willing to pay 46 cents (per 
ounce) more for an organic than conventional coffee. Individuals with more education 
and higher income were willing to pay more for organic relative to conventional products. 
Hainmueller, Hiscox, and Sequeira (2014) conducted field experiments in a U.S. grocery 
store chain and found that consumers were willing to pay higher premiums for coffee 
with eco-labels. They also found that consumers exhibited differential levels of price 
sensitivity for different types of Fair Trade labeled coffee. Consumers buying the lower-
priced coffee blend (CB) were price sensitive, while consumers buying the higher priced 
French Roast (FR) Regular coffee were much less price sensitive. 
Following a few studies which analyzed U.S. consumer behavior of organic 
vegetables, fresh fruit and vegetables, poultry meat and milk by identifying household 
economic and socio-demographic factors (Dettmann and Dimitri 2009; Kasteridis and 
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Yen, 2012; Smith, Huang, and Lin, 2009; Van Loo, et al., 2010; Alviola and Capps, 
2010), our study aims to examine the driving factors determining U.S. household demand 
for organic coffee, particularly own-price effects and income effects, as well as the 
effects of socio-demographic characteristics of households. We use Nielsen Homescan 
data, which provide detailed product characteristics information as well as a vast array of 
household socio-demographic data. A typical problem for demand estimation studies that 
use household-level microdata and mainly measure the effects of demographic variables, 
is that for a given good, many households have no consumption, implying a censored 
dependent variable. Techniques that do not take this censored dependent variable into 
account will yield biased results. Heckman's two-step technique is utilized to combat this 
problem. A household’s binary decision of whether or not to buy organic (or non-organic) 
coffee is followed by the continuous choice of how much to buy. The results are then 
presented and compared with those obtained using an uncensored technique.    
To our knowledge, no previous studies have investigated the sociodemographic 
characteristics of households buying organic coffee by using scanner data. Our study 
aims to fill this gap. The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II presents the 
empirical methodology. Section III describes the data and variable construction. Section 
IV discusses the estimation procedure and empirical results, and Section V concludes 
with a discussion and summary of our findings. 
 
3.2 Methodology 
 
 
A household’s decision to buy certified organic coffee or conventional coffee is assumed 
to occur in a two-stage decision process. A consumer first chooses whether to purchase 
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organic (conventional) coffee and then decides the quantity. This two-stage decision is 
estimated using the Heckman’s selection model, also known as the type-II Tobit model 
(Amemiya, 1985, pp. 385– 387), or the Heckit method. Although it was originally 
intended to solve the selection bias problem in missing data contexts, it has been widely 
used to model the appearance of a large cluster of zeros. It views the outcome of a 
discrete choice as a reflection of an underlying regression and provides consistent 
estimates to correct for the bias that occurs if the sample selection is based on 
unobservables (Heckman, 1979). Although here we don’t have a missing data problem, 
we use it as a corner solution in response to a data censoring problem
18
. It explicitly 
allows correlation between the participation and amount decisions (after conditioning on 
covariates). The first stage decision (whether to buy or not to buy organic coffee) can be 
modeled as a dichotomous choice problem indicated by a binary indicator variable, which 
is a function of the latent variables and is estimated as a probit model by maximum 
likelihood. The second stage (how much to buy) is estimated with ordinary least squares 
(OLS).  
In the first stage, the selection mechanism can be expressed as a probit equation 
(participation/selection equation): 
 
Prob (Qorganicit> 0) = Prob(Qorganicit > 0 | 𝛶, Wit, uit)  
                = 𝚽 (𝛾0 + 𝛾2 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾3 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾4 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 
                                                        
18
 Wooldridge (2010, p667) recommends the use of the term ‘corner solution model’ instead of 
‘censored regression model (tobit)’. Although the econometric models for corner solution 
responses and censored data have similar statistical structures, the underlying assumptions are 
different. For the former model, we are able to observe the entire possible range of the response 
variable. Data censoring arises because of a survey sampling scheme or institutional constraints. 
Censored regression model aims to investigate an underlying response variable that are not fully 
observed because it is censored above or below certain values.  
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                                + 𝛾5 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾6 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾7  𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾8  𝑅𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑖 
                    + 𝛾9 𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖 +  𝛾10𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡)         𝑢𝑖𝑡~𝑁[0,1]     
 
where Qorganicit denotes the quantity of organic coffee household i purchases in 
year t. Probability is 1 if household i consumes any organic coffee in year t (Qorganicit > 
0) and 0 otherwise. Φ  is the cumulative distribution function for a standard normal 
distribution. Wit is a vector of variables that are related to the decision to purchase 
organic coffee. In line with the literature, household socioeconomic characteristics are 
included; γs are vectors of parameters to be estimated; uit is the error term. 
From these estimates, the nonselection hazard—what Heckman (1979) referred to 
as the the inverse Mills ratio (IMR), λit—for each observation in the selected sample is 
computed as 
?̂?𝑖𝑡 =
𝜙(𝑊𝑖𝑡
′ ?̂?)
𝚽(𝑊𝑖𝑡
′ ?̂?)
 
 
where ϕ is the probability density function of a standard normal distribution. 
In the second stage, we estimate the equation of primary interest: i.e., the demand 
for organic coffee as 
Qorganicit = 𝑿𝒊𝒕
′ 𝜷 +  𝑖𝑡                                    𝑖𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜀
2) 
 
Xit constitutes the vector of explanatory variables related to the amount of organic coffee 
purchased. s are vectors of parameters to be estimated; εit is the error term;  εit and uit are 
assumed to have a bivariate normal distribution with zero means and correlation ρ: 
corr(uit, εit) = ρ and (uit, εit)  ~ N2 [(0, 0), (1, 𝜎𝜀
2, ρσε)]. The IMR is added as an additional 
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“control” variable to incorporate the censoring latent variables and correct possible 
selection bias. Hence, using the moments of the incidentally truncated bivariate normal 
distribution theorem (Johnson and Kotz, 1974; see also Greene, 2012, p. 873), the 
second-stage regression model (outcome/intensity equation) can be written as: 
 
         Qorganicit | Qorganicit>0 = E[Qorganicit | Qorganicit>0] + vit 
                                                    = E[Qorganicit | uit>−Wit
′ Υ] + vit 
                                                    = Xit
′ β + E[εit | uit>−Wit
′ Υ] + vit 
                                                    = Xit
′ β + ρσελ̂it + vit= Xit
′ β + βλλ̂it + vit    vit~N(0, σv
2) 
Or  
 lnQorganicit |Qorganicit>0 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑁𝑜𝑛_𝑜𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡 
                                           + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 
                    + 𝛽6 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑡 
                                                + 𝛽9 𝑅𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑖 +  𝛽10 𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖 +  𝛽11𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡             
+  𝛽𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑡 +  𝑣𝑖𝑡        
We use a logarithmical transformation to ameliorate potential nonnormality and 
heteroscedasticity of the error term; thus the coefficient on price is the price elasticity
19
.  
The problem of sample selection bias can be regarded as a misspecification 
problem arising through the omission of a regressor variable, the nonlinear selectivity 
correction term λit. There are only two cases where bias will not be a problem: First, if the 
coefficient on the IMR (λit) is not statistically significant from zero; second, if ρ =0. 
The sample selection model can also be estimated by maximum likelihood, which 
                                                        
19 Wooldridge (2010, P697-703) named this type of model the exponential type II Tobit 
(ET2T) model.  
 67 
estimates all the parameters in both equations simultaneously and provides full-
information maximum likelihood (FIML) estimates that are viewed more efficient than 
the two-step estimates (Heckit). Because it uses the likelihood function rather than the 
method of moments and the estimation of ρ is subject to the constraint −1 < ρ < 1, while 
the moment-based estimator of ρ is not bounded by zero and one. The two-step estimator 
estimates the single coefficient on λ and the structural parameters σ and ρ are deduced by 
the method of moments while the maximum likelihood estimator computes estimates of 
these parameters directly (Greene, 2012, P878). In addition, the two-part model (2PM), 
which runs a separate probit or logit for sample inclusion followed by a regression, has 
also been widely used as an alternative method. It assumes that conditional on a set of 
observed covariates, the mechanisms determining Pr and Y are independent (Manning, 
Duan, and Rogers 1987). Dow and Norton (2003) proposed an adapted empirical mean 
square error test to choose between Heckit and the 2PM (i.e. the Toro-Vizcarrondo and 
Wallace empirical mean square error test of the difference in the marginal effects of 
interest). 
There are a few issues which need to be addressed when using the Heckman 
selection model: exclusion restriction, marginal effects, and collinearity (Puhani, 2000; 
Vance,2014). The exclusion restriction requires that X should be a strict subset of W, so 
the selection equation has at least one more identifying variable than in the outcome 
equation. The reason for this is that while the IMR is a nonlinear function of W, it is often 
well approximated by a linear function. If no variables that are in X are excluded from W, 
there is no exclusion restriction. Thus λ̂it can be highly correlated with the elements of X, 
causing inflated standard errors and parameter instability (including the t -test on the IMR 
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term) (Moffitt, 1999). In order to correctly and sufficiently identify the model, one needs 
to assume that there is at least one element of W that appears in P() that does not appear 
in E[y|y>0]. The incorporation of theoretically supported exclusion restrictions in the first 
stage of the Heckit ameliorates these problems by reducing multicollinearity among the 
predictors and the IMR in the outcome equation. In their absence, however, the 
consequences for the model estimates can be profound. Nonetheless, such exclusion 
assumptions are often unavailable or hard to defend. Shrestha & Feiock (2011) and 
Karreth & Tir (2013) provide a theoretical justification that elaborates why these 
variables are hypothesized to uniquely determine the selection process but not the 
outcome variable.  
For the probit model, we have categorical explanatory variables (coded as dummy 
or indicator variables). Marginal effects are the partial effects of each explanatory 
variable on the probability that the observed dependent variable Yi >0. The appropriate 
marginal effect for a binary independent variable, say, d, would be: 
 
Marginal effect = Prob[Y = 1 | ?̅?it, d = 1] − Prob[Y = 1 | ?̅?it, d = 0]  
                         = 𝚽(?̅?𝑖𝑡|𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑘=𝑛
′ ?̂?) − 𝚽(?̅?𝑖𝑡|𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑘=𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒
′ ?̂?) 
 
where ?̅?it, denotes the means of all the other variables in the model. 
If a variable appears only in the outcome equation, the coefficient on it can be 
interpreted as the marginal effect of a one unit change in that variable on Y|Y is 
observed---which is a conditional mean. Price variables only appear in the demand 
equation. The coefficient is the marginal effect:  
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𝜕𝐸[𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑜𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡 | 𝑄𝑜𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡 > 0]
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽1 
 
which is the own-price elasticity of demand; 
 
𝜕𝐸[𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑜𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡 | 𝑄𝑜𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡 > 0]
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑁𝑜𝑛_𝑜𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽2 
is the cross-price elasticity of demand. 
Sigelman & Zeng (1999) demonstrate that the marginal effects of the variables 
that appear in both the selection and outcome equations are generally not given by the 
coefficient estimates, themselves, but rather must be calculated by differentiating the 
outcome equation. A change in an explanatory variable that is common to both stages of 
the decision process has two effects: (1) it affects the likelihood of whether the 
commodity will be consumed; and (2) if the commodity is consumed, it affects the 
expenditure on that commodity(Akay and Tsakas, 2008, Hoffmann and Kassouf, 2005, 
Saha, et al., 1997, Vance, 2009, Yen, 2005; Yen and Rosinski, 2008). W and X have 
some common variables.  The marginal effect of the regressors on yi in the observed 
sample consists of two components. There is the direct effect on the mean of yi, which is 
β. In addition, for a particular independent variable, if it appears in the probability that is 
positive, then it will influence yi through its presence in λi. The full effect of changes in a 
regressor that appears in both Xi and Wi on y is derived by differentiating the conditional 
mean of the demand equations (2).  
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For a given continuous variable, 𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑘  denotes the kth regressor common to both 
Wit and Xit. 
 
𝜕𝐸[𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑜𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡 | 𝑄𝑜𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡 > 0]
𝜕𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑘
= 𝛽𝑘 + 𝛽𝜆
𝜕𝜆𝑖𝑡
𝜕𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑘
= 𝛽𝑘 −  𝛽𝜆𝛾𝑘(𝜆𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝜆𝑖𝑡𝑊𝑖𝑡
′ ?̂?) 
 
Because 0<𝜆𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝜆𝑖𝑡𝑊𝑖𝑡
′ ?̂? <1, the additional term serves to reduce the marginal effect. So 
for every element of X, the marginal effect is less than the corresponding coefficient. It is 
quite possible that the magnitude, sign, and statistical significance of the effect might all 
be different from those of the estimate of 𝛽𝑘 . 
For our model, the majority of the explanatory variables are categorical variables; 
their marginal effects are calculated as the discrete first difference from the base category. 
The discrete difference is not equal to the derivative for the logistic regression, probit, etc. 
The discrete difference calculation is generally viewed as better for factor variables than 
the derivative calculation because the discrete difference is what would actually be 
observed. 
The partial effect for level n of categorical variable 𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑘 , is discrete first difference 
from the base category: 
∆E[lnQorganicit | lnQorganicit > 0, xitk]
∆xitk
  
= E[lnQit | Qit  > 0, xitk = n] − E[lnQit |Qit > 0, xitk = base]  
                   = βk + βλ∆γk =  βk +  βλ(γk|xitk=n −  γk|xitk=base) 
                   =  βk + βλ [
ϕ(W̅̅̅it|xitk=n
′ Υ̂)
Φ(W̅̅̅it|xitk=n
′ Υ̂)
−
ϕ(W̅̅̅it|xitk=base
′ Υ̂)
Φ(W̅̅̅it|xitk=base
′ Υ̂)
]          
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Since 𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑜𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡 is the natural logarithm of organic coffee demand, the conditional 
marginal effect equation shown above corresponds to a relative change in quantities. 
If ME is the estimated value of the conditional marginal effect, the estimated 
percentage change in organic coffee quantity (level) purchased associated with the 
change in xitk is [exp(ME) – 1]100%. 
Conventional coffee demand can be modeled in a similar way. We tried several 
functional forms such as linear, quadratic and linear-log to find that Linear-Log model 
(we used logged price variables in the model) outperforms other functional forms as far 
as the model fit, significance of variables and loss matrices, such as AIC and Schwarz 
criteria, are concerned. 
 
3.3 Data and variable construction 
 
We extract ground and whole bean coffee product
20
 data from the 2011-2013 Nielsen 
Homescan panel dataset, which covers nearly 0.7 million monthly transactions made by 
55,470 households located in 264 counties from the 48 continental states plus the District 
of Columbia. The households in the Nielsen data set constitute a stratified random sample, 
selected on both demographic and geographic targets, aiming to construct a nationally 
representative panel of consumer purchases. With no intentional clustering, the 
stratification ensures that the sample matches the demographic profile of consumers 
according to the U.S. Census (the census tract level).  
                                                        
20 Instant coffee, coffee beverage, and coffee substitutes (coffee partners and alternatives) are 
excluded since ground and whole bean coffee products have the largest degree of product variety, 
with number of UPCs accounting for almost 80% of the total.  
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Once enrolled, households are provided with a scanner and are required to scan all 
items following a purchase. The barcode is scanned and the Universal Product Code 
(UPC) is recorded for each product. Households are further instructed to enter the price 
and quantity for that particular purchase. If the purchase is made in Nielsen cooperating 
retailers, the price prompt is bypassed and filled by Nielsen with the average weighted 
price for the item that week in that particular store. Compared to Nielsen Retail Scanner 
data, the Homescan data have more retail channel types. In our dataset, consumers 
purchase coffee products via 62 different retail channels, with the majority of purchases 
made in grocery stores, followed by discount stores
21
 and warehouse clubs. 
For each household, Nielsen records a wealth of socioeconomic characteristics as 
well as the main place of residence and store locations for their shopping trips. The 
demographic information (education level, age, and racial/ethnic composition) is 
provided for both the female and the male heads of households. In this study, we 
implicitly assume that females make the majority of coffee purchases: if a female was 
present in the household, her demographic information was used; otherwise the male’s 
demographic information was used. We followed this rule for age, education and 
employment. Age of the household head includes four groups: those less than 35, 35–49 
years, 50-64 years, and 65 older. Education of household head has four categories: less 
than high school education, high school graduate, or some college, college graduate or 
higher. In addition, we also construct dummy variables, which indicate households only 
with female or male heads.   
                                                        
21
 Nielsen codes all mass merchandisers, including Kmart, Target, and Wal-Mart in the "Discount 
Store" channel.  
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Income, presence of children, race, and ethnicity are reported for the entire 
household. Race consists of five categories, representing Caucasian, Asian, African 
American, and other, while ethnicity indicates whether the household is of Hispanic 
origin. Nielsen classifies household income into 16 grouped categories, ranging from a 
low of under $5,000 a year to a high of over $100,000 per year, which we reclassified 
into four categories: low, lower middle, upper middle, and upper incomes. Low incomes 
included all households with incomes $24,999 and below, lower middle incomes were 
households between $25,000 and $49,999, upper middle incomes fell into the range of 
$50,000 to $69,999, and upper incomes were households with incomes $70,000 and 
greater a year. In order to capture whether the presence of children in households 
influences a household’s decision to purchase organic coffee, households are assigned to 
one of two groups: those with at least one child under the age of 18, and households 
without children under 18 (including those with no children). 
Table 12 presents summary statistics of the model’s variables. In our final dataset, 
there were 540 different brands and 6,714 ground and whole bean coffee products at the 
UPC level. Used as the first stage discrete dependent variable, an organic household is 
defined as a household that makes at least one purchase of a relevant organic coffee 
product during the year. In our sample, 5,360 households were organic coffee buyers, 
while 109,272 households were conventional coffee buyers. Quantity data are 
standardized in terms of ounces; unit values (dollars per ounce, after coupon values) are 
used as proxies for prices. The average price for organic coffee was 14 cents higher than 
that for conventional coffee per ounce. The majority of households in our sample were 
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Caucasian, income ranges of either $25,000-49,999 or ≥$70,000, had two household 
members and no children under 18. 
Table 12. Descriptive Statistics of Analysis Variables (2011-2013) 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Min Max 
Conventional coffee 
Quantity (oz) 109,272 176.89 191.06 1 3909.8 
Price ($/oz) 109,272 0.35 0.16 0 3.29 
Expenditure 109,272 54.42 61.09 0 2006.7 
Organic coffee 
Quantity (oz) 5,360 41.71 65.34 1.25 1120 
Price ($/oz) 5,360 0.49 0.23 0 1.68 
Expenditure 5,360 17.69 28.79 0 393.16 
Household Income 
≤$24,999 114,632 0.158 0.365 0 1 
$25,000~49,999 114,632 0.309 0.462 0 1 
$50,000~69,999 114,632 0.188 0.390 0 1 
≥$70,000 114,632 0.345 0.475 0 1 
Household Size 
1 114,632 0.208 0.406 0 1 
2 114,632 0.468 0.499 0 1 
3 114,632 0.146 0.353 0 1 
4 114,632 0.111 0.314 0 1 
5 114,632 0.043 0.203 0 1 
6+ 114,632 0.024 0.153 0 1 
Age and presence of children 
No children under 18 114,632 0.800 0.400 0 1 
Children under 18 114,632 0.200 0.400 0 1 
Female household head Age 
<35 114,632 0.045 0.207 0 1 
35-49 114,632 0.218 0.413 0 1 
50-64 114,632 0.424 0.494 0 1 
65+ 114,632 0.230 0.421 0 1 
Female household head employment (per week) 
Under 30 hours 114,632 0.121 0.326 0 1 
30-34 114,632 0.046 0.210 0 1 
35+ 114,632 0.321 0.467 0 1 
Not employed 114,632 0.429 0.495 0 1 
Female head education 
Less than HS 114,632 0.024 0.154 0 1 
HS graduate 114,632 0.242 0.428 0 1 
Some college 114,632 0.292 0.455 0 1 
BA + 114,632 0.359 0.480 0 1 
Male household Head Age 
<35 114,632 0.030 0.169 0 1 
35-49 114,632 0.176 0.381 0 1 
50-64 114,632 0.352 0.478 0 1 
65+ 114,632 0.222 0.416 0 1 
Male household head employment 
Under 30 hours 114,632 0.049 0.215 0 1 
30-34 114,632 0.025 0.156 0 1 
35+ 114,632 0.420 0.494 0 1 
Not employed 114,632 0.286 0.452 0 1 
Continued  
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Table 12. Continued 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Min Max 
Male head education 
Less than HS 114,632 0.041 0.198 0 1 
HS graduate 114,632 0.201 0.401 0 1 
Some college 114,632 0.23 0.421 0 1 
BA + 114,632 0.307 0.461 0 1 
Female household head only 114,632 0.221 0.415 0 1 
Male household head only 114,632 0.082 0.275 0 1 
Race 
White 114,632 0.87 0.336 0 1 
Black 114,632 0.067 0.251 0 1 
Asian 114,632 0.022 0.147 0 1 
Other 114,632 0.04 0.197 0 1 
Hispanic Origin 
Yes 114,632 0.053 0.224 0 1 
No 114,632 0.947 0.224 0 1 
 
A problem arising due to zero consumption is that of missing prices. In order to 
estimate cross price elasticities, prices must be available for all items for all households. 
However, for households not consuming a particular item, there will be no data on the 
price of that item. Usually the missing prices are imputed by performing a regression 
with the data on the price of the item from those households who did consume it. These 
regressions specify the price as a function of regional dummies, seasonal dummies, and 
income. These regressions are then used to estimate the missing prices for those 
households which did not consume that particular item. The properties of estimates using 
data obtained in this manner were discussed by Dagenais (1973) and Gourieroux and 
Monfort (1981). Kyureghian, Capps, and Nayga (2011) perform a comprehensive 
analysis of different imputation methods on missing prices using Nielsen data, and 
conclude that the method of regression and/or conditional mean method is the best and 
leads to unbiased estimates in the majority of cases.  
The procedure of using information provided by other customer’s purchases for 
missing prices is actually superior to ignoring that information and treating the missing 
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prices as missing at random. So instead of imputation, we calculated the annual average 
prices for both organic and non-organic coffee sold in stores located in a specific area 
sharing the first three-digit zip codes, which describe the sectional center facility (SCF) 
or "sec center." An SCF is a central mail processing facility with those three digits. The 
SCF sorts mail to all post offices with those first three digits in their ZIP codes. We then 
match these prices to each household by using the store zip code information in which 
they made the purchase.  
 
3.4 Empirical results  
 
For comparison, we estimated the parameters of the sample selection model by maximum 
likelihood. Maximum likelihood, Heckman two-step, and two-part estimates of the 
organic and non-organic demand equations are shown in Table 13 and Table 14, 
respectively.  Maximum likelihood estimates are FIML estimates, which are consistent 
and efficient, we focus on the results throughout. Probit model coefficients are almost 
identical among the three estimators. Coefficients on prices are similar across different 
estimators, while there are some differences for coefficients on demographic variables. 
The likelihood-ratio test reported for the MLE output is an equivalent test of ρ = 0 and is 
computationally the comparison of the joint likelihood of an independent probit model 
for the selection equation and a regression model on the observed demand data against 
the Heckman model likelihood. Chi-squared test statistics, which are statistically 
significant at the 1% level, justify the Heckman selection equation with these data for 
both the organic and non-organic demand. 
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Table 13. Estimated Selection Corrected Organic Coffee Demand Equation 
  Maximum Likelihood Two-Step Two-Part 
Variables Probit Demand Probit Demand Probit Demand 
 Prob(Q>0) ln(Quantity) Prob(Q>0) ln(Quantity)  Prob(Q>0) ln(Quantity)  
ln(Price OG)  -0.617***  -0.611***  -0.611*** 
  (0.051)  (0.049)  (0.042) 
ln(Price Non OG)  -0.655***  -0.732***  -0.731*** 
  (0.107)  (0.240)  (0.112) 
Household income   
$25,000-$49,999 0.065*** 0.029 0.064*** 0.220 0.064*** -0.057 
 (0.022) (0.053) (0.022) (1.559) (0.022) (0.043) 
$50,000-$69,999 0.116*** 0.107* 0.114*** 0.449 0.113*** -0.041 
 (0.025) (0.060) (0.025) (2.759) (0.025) (0.048) 
≥$70,000 0.152*** 0.199*** 0.147*** 0.651 0.146*** 0.021 
 (0.024) (0.059) (0.024) (3.539) (0.024) (0.047) 
Household size       
2 -0.043 -0.099 -0.041 -0.229 -0.041 -0.053 
 (0.026) (0.065) (0.026) (0.997) (0.026) (0.053) 
3 -0.094*** -0.205** -0.095*** -0.468 -0.095*** -0.062 
 (0.032) (0.080) (0.032) (2.290) (0.032) (0.066) 
4 -0.094** -0.173* -0.091** -0.443 -0.092** -0.053 
 (0.037) (0.092) (0.037) (2.205) (0.037) (0.076) 
5 -0.106** -0.178 -0.104** -0.484 -0.105** -0.041 
 (0.046) (0.113) (0.046) (2.504) (0.046) (0.095) 
6+ -0.068 -0.180 -0.064 -0.384 -0.065 -0.109 
 (0.054) (0.128) (0.054) (1.572) (0.054) (0.104) 
Age and presence of children   
Children under 18 -0.007 0.039 -0.008 0.025 -0.009 0.057 
 (0.025) (0.062) (0.026) (0.236) (0.025) (0.052) 
Female head age 
<35 0.300*** 0.240 0.298*** 1.100 0.299*** -0.181 
 (0.067) (0.162) (0.069) (7.203) (0.068) (0.123) 
35-49 0.255*** 0.263* 0.255*** 0.994 0.257*** -0.104 
 (0.063) (0.150) (0.064) (6.173) (0.064) (0.114) 
50-64 0.213*** 0.187 0.208*** 0.815 0.210*** -0.086 
 (0.062) (0.147) (0.063) (5.069) (0.062) (0.112) 
65+ 0.118* 0.059 0.115* 0.410 0.116* -0.088 
 (0.062) (0.147) (0.063) (2.820) (0.062) (0.112) 
Female head employment   
Under 30 hours 0.076*** 0.046 0.076*** 0.259 0.076*** -0.066* 
 (0.021) (0.048) (0.021) (1.829) (0.021) (0.039) 
30-34 hours 0.041 0.059 0.038 0.185 0.037 0.020 
 (0.031) (0.074) (0.031) (0.943) (0.031) (0.063) 
35+ hours 0.006 -0.012 0.004 0.013 0.003 -0.002 
 (0.017) (0.041) (0.017) (0.130) (0.017) (0.033) 
Female head education 
Less than HS -0.327*** -0.590*** -0.329*** -1.514 -0.329*** -0.091 
 (0.052) (0.129) (0.053) (7.994) (0.053) (0.106) 
Continued 
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Table 13. Continued 
  Maximum Likelihood Two-Step Two-Part 
Variables Probit Demand Probit Demand Probit Demand 
 Prob(Q>0) ln(Quantity) Prob(Q>0) ln(Quantity)  Prob(Q>0) ln(Quantity)  
HS graduate -0.254*** -0.467*** -0.256*** -1.180 -0.256*** -0.078** 
 (0.019) (0.048) (0.019) (6.187) (0.019) (0.039) 
Some college -0.104*** -0.150*** -0.105*** -0.435 -0.104*** 0.012 
 (0.016) (0.039) (0.016) (2.513) (0.016) (0.032) 
Female head only 0.041* -0.041 0.038 0.085 0.038 -0.078 
 (0.024) (0.060) (0.024) (0.929) (0.024) (0.049) 
Race and ethnicity   
Black -0.252*** -0.480*** -0.251*** -1.199 -0.252*** -0.115** 
 (0.030) (0.071) (0.030) (6.089) (0.030) (0.059) 
Asian 0.048 0.043 0.049 0.186 0.051 -0.020 
 (0.040) (0.095) (0.040) (1.180) (0.040) (0.075) 
Other 0.006 0.052 -0.003 0.097 -0.003 0.111 
 (0.036) (0.098) (0.035) (0.216) (0.035) (0.082) 
Non-Hispanic -0.017 0.051 -0.020 0.012 -0.023 0.100 
 (0.031) (0.076) (0.031) (0.521) (0.031) (0.063) 
Male head only (=1) ×Male head age 
<35 0.341** 0.288 0.326** 1.305 0.326** -0.096 
 (0.137) (0.406) (0.135) (7.906) (0.135) (0.318) 
35-49 0.346*** 0.312* 0.344*** 1.305 0.344*** -0.174 
 (0.077) (0.175) (0.076) (8.316) (0.077) (0.136) 
50-64 0.214*** 0.266* 0.203*** 0.919 0.203*** 0.040 
 (0.065) (0.156) (0.065) (4.949) (0.065) (0.122) 
Male head employment   
Under 30 hours -0.211** -0.281 -0.210** -0.879 -0.210** 0.030 
 (0.098) (0.220) (0.099) (5.136) (0.099) (0.181) 
30-34 hours 0.064 -0.122 0.059 0.070 0.059 -0.179 
 (0.119) (0.302) (0.120) (1.563) (0.119) (0.238) 
35+ hours -0.026 -0.078 -0.025 -0.152 -0.024 -0.045 
 (0.058) (0.146) (0.057) (0.684) (0.058) (0.120) 
Male head education   
Less than HS -0.498** -1.046 -0.525** -2.287 -0.525** -0.013 
 (0.229) (0.770) (0.232) (12.846) (0.226) (0.779) 
HS graduate -0.422*** -0.936*** -0.419*** -2.149 -0.419*** -0.324* 
 (0.081) (0.217) (0.081) (10.258) (0.081) (0.165) 
Some college -0.076 -0.183 -0.076 -0.400 -0.076 -0.078 
 (0.051) (0.124) (0.051) (1.834) (0.051) (0.097) 
Rho()  0.930     
  (0.008)     
Sigma()  1.817     
  (0.045)     
Lambda (λ)  1.690  4.967   
  (0.054)  (27.874)   
Constant -1.825*** -1.669*** -1.814*** -9.075 -1.811*** 1.910*** 
 (0.065) (0.223) (0.067) (61.642) (0.066) (0.169) 
Observations 114,624 114,624 114,624 114,624 114,632 5,352 
R-squared          0.131 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
***
 p<0.01, 
**
 p<0.05, 
*
 p<0.1.  
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Table 14. Estimated Selection Corrected Non-Organic Coffee Demand Equation 
 
 
Variables 
Maximum Likelihood Two-Step Two-Part 
Probit Demand Probit Demand Probit Demand 
Prob(Q>0) ln(Quantity) Prob(Q>0) ln(Quantity)  Prob(Q>0) ln(Quantity)  
ln(Price Non OG)  -0.737***  -0.798***  -0.871*** 
  (0.017)  (0.011)  (0.020) 
ln(Price OG)  0.027***  0.031***  0.159*** 
  (0.009)  (0.012)  (0.010) 
Household income 
$25,000-$49,999 -0.035* 0.024* -0.055** 0.030 -0.064*** 0.008 
 (0.019) (0.013) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.012) 
$50,000-$69,999 -0.042* 0.039*** -0.094*** 0.050 -0.113*** 0.015 
 (0.021) (0.015) (0.026) (0.031) (0.025) (0.014) 
≥$70,000 -0.033 0.038*** -0.112*** 0.054 -0.146*** 0.018 
 (0.021) (0.015) (0.025) (0.035) (0.024) (0.014) 
Household size 
2 0.043* 0.217*** 0.042 0.210*** 0.041 0.208*** 
 (0.024) (0.016) (0.027) (0.024) (0.026) (0.015) 
3 0.086*** 0.201*** 0.098*** 0.189*** 0.095*** 0.207*** 
 (0.028) (0.020) (0.033) (0.037) (0.032) (0.018) 
4 0.092*** 0.224*** 0.093** 0.212*** 0.092** 0.226*** 
 (0.033) (0.023) (0.038) (0.039) (0.037) (0.021) 
5 0.136*** 0.229*** 0.102** 0.212*** 0.105** 0.230*** 
 (0.042) (0.029) (0.047) (0.046) (0.046) (0.027) 
6+ 0.051 0.277*** 0.057 0.265*** 0.065 0.253*** 
 (0.046) (0.034) (0.056) (0.046) (0.054) (0.032) 
Age and presence of children 
Children under 18 -0.008 -0.124*** 0.007 -0.123*** 0.009 -0.108*** 
 (0.023) (0.016) (0.027) (0.021) (0.025) (0.015) 
Female head age 
<35 -0.191
***
 -0.307
***
 -0.333
***
 -0.280
***
 -0.299
***
 -0.385
***
 
 (0.057) (0.040) (0.071) (0.104) (0.068) (0.036) 
35-49 -0.167*** -0.074** -0.284*** -0.052 -0.257*** -0.149*** 
 (0.052) (0.036) (0.066) (0.088) (0.064) (0.033) 
50-64 -0.175*** 0.100*** -0.233*** 0.118 -0.210*** 0.032 
 (0.051) (0.035) (0.065) (0.075) (0.062) (0.032) 
65+ -0.160*** 0.091*** -0.127* 0.106* -0.116* 0.061* 
 (0.051) (0.035) (0.065) (0.056) (0.062) (0.032) 
Female head employment 
Under 30 hours -0.045** -0.021 -0.076*** -0.015 -0.076*** -0.050*** 
 (0.018) (0.014) (0.021) (0.028) (0.021) (0.012) 
30-34 hours -0.000 -0.061*** -0.037 -0.058** -0.037 -0.070*** 
 (0.028) (0.020) (0.032) (0.028) (0.031) (0.018) 
35+ hours 0.021 -0.046*** -0.008 -0.046*** -0.003 -0.048*** 
 (0.015) (0.011) (0.018) (0.014) (0.017) (0.010) 
Continued  
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Table 14. Continued  
 
 
Variables 
Maximum Likelihood Two-Step Two-Part 
Probit Demand Probit Demand Probit Demand 
Prob(Q>0) ln(Quantity) Prob(Q>0) ln(Quantity)  Prob(Q>0) ln(Quantity)  
Female head education 
Less than HS 0.142*** 0.060** 0.328*** 0.033 0.329*** 0.145*** 
 (0.040) (0.026) (0.054) (0.089) (0.053) (0.024) 
HS graduate 0.140*** 0.036*** 0.252*** 0.014 0.256*** 0.107*** 
 (0.016) (0.011) (0.020) (0.070) (0.019) (0.011) 
Some college 0.035** 0.039*** 0.107*** 0.030 0.104*** 0.075*** 
 (0.014) (0.010) (0.016) (0.035) (0.016) (0.010) 
Female head only 0.066*** -0.222*** -0.023 -0.222*** -0.038 -0.223*** 
 (0.022) (0.015) (0.025) (0.020) (0.024) (0.014) 
Race and ethnicity 
Black 0.269*** -0.465*** 0.275*** -0.487*** 0.252*** -0.369*** 
 (0.027) (0.016) (0.030) (0.071) (0.030) (0.015) 
Asian -0.018 -0.208*** -0.014 -0.202*** -0.051 -0.197*** 
 (0.037) (0.026) (0.041) (0.035) (0.040) (0.023) 
Other 0.079** -0.075*** 0.014 -0.080*** 0.003 -0.059*** 
 (0.032) (0.022) (0.036) (0.029) (0.035) (0.021) 
Non-Hispanic 0.032 0.076*** -0.001 0.074*** 0.023 0.080*** 
 (0.027) (0.019) (0.031) (0.025) (0.031) (0.018) 
Male head only (=1) × 
Male head age 
<35 -0.154 -0.266*** -0.336** -0.239* -0.326** -0.336*** 
 (0.120) (0.086) (0.139) (0.141) (0.135) (0.077) 
35-49 -0.175*** -0.004 -0.359*** 0.022 -0.344*** -0.122*** 
 (0.066) (0.045) (0.078) (0.110) (0.077) (0.041) 
50-64 -0.142*** 0.130*** -0.206*** 0.145** -0.203*** 0.073** 
 (0.053) (0.034) (0.066) (0.066) (0.065) (0.031) 
Male head employment 
Under 30 hours 0.232*** -0.108** 0.206** -0.125 0.210** -0.051 
 (0.082) (0.051) (0.102) (0.082) (0.099) (0.048) 
30-34 hours -0.119 0.089 -0.073 0.102 -0.059 0.061 
 (0.094) (0.073) (0.124) (0.102) (0.119) (0.066) 
35+ hours 0.036 -0.078** 0.021 -0.080* 0.024 -0.072** 
 (0.048) (0.034) (0.059) (0.045) (0.058) (0.031) 
Male head education 
Less than HS 0.250 -0.109 0.508** -0.143 0.525** 0.008 
 (0.174) (0.091) (0.240) (0.162) (0.226) (0.089) 
HS graduate 0.226*** -0.089** 0.418*** -0.120 0.419*** 0.006 
 (0.063) (0.038) (0.083) (0.106) (0.081) (0.036) 
Some college 0.028 0.038 0.084 0.030 0.076 0.060** 
 (0.044) (0.031) (0.052) (0.047) (0.051) (0.028) 
Continued 
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Table 14. Continued  
 
 
Variables 
Maximum Likelihood Two-Step Two-Part 
Probit Demand Probit Demand Probit Demand 
Prob(Q>0) ln(Quantity) Prob(Q>0) ln(Quantity)  Prob(Q>0) ln(Quantity)  
       
Rho()    -0.948  -1.000   
  (0.002)     
Sigma()  1.233  1.590   
  (0.003)     
Lambda (λ)  -1.169  -1.591   
  (0.005)  (1.381)   
Constant 1.558*** 3.738*** 1.747*** 3.715*** 1.811*** 3.536*** 
 (0.055) (0.043) (0.068) (0.142) (0.066) (0.042) 
Observations 96,155 96,155 96,155 96,155 114,632 96,155 
R-squared      0.1517 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
***
 p<0.01, 
**
 p<0.05, 
*
 p<0.1.  
 
Own price elasticities for organic and non-organic coffee are -0.617 and -0.737, 
respectively. They are both less than 1, indicating coffee in general has an inelastic 
demand. Compared to non-organic coffee, organic coffee consumers are less sensitive to 
price changes. This is consistent with findings from Hainmueller, Hiscox, and Sequeira 
(2014), while at odds with Alviola and Capps (2010), who found the demand for organic 
milk was elastic, but the demand for conventional milk was inelastic. The cross-price 
elasticity is negative, indicating that they regard non-organic coffee as a complementary 
good. For non-organic consumers, organic coffee is a substitute, positive cross-price 
elasticity. This interesting result show that with respect to non-organic coffee, organic 
coffee may be perceived either as a substitute or a complement. 
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Table 15. Marginal Effects 
  Organic coffee Non-Organic coffee 
 Probit Demand Probit Demand 
 Variables Prob(Q>0)  ln(Quantity)  Prob(Q>0)  ln(Quantity)   
ln(Price OG)  -0.617***  0.027*** 
  (0.051)  (0.009) 
ln(Price Non OG)  -0.655***  -0.737*** 
  (0.107)  (0.017) 
Household income 
$25,000-$49,999 0.006*** -0.527*** -0.004* 0.033** 
 (0.002) (0.100) (0.002) (0.014) 
$50,000-$69,999 0.011*** -0.713*** -0.005** 0.060*** 
 (0.002) (0.059) (0.003) (0.017) 
≥$70,000 0.015*** -0.736*** -0.004 0.061*** 
 (0.002) (0.056) (0.002) (0.017) 
Household size     
2 -0.005 -0.034 0.005* 0.257*** 
 (0.003) (0.050) (0.003) (0.018) 
3 -0.010*** -0.063 0.011*** 0.252*** 
 (0.003) (0.059) (0.004) (0.022) 
4 -0.010** -0.034 0.011*** 0.283*** 
 (0.004) (0.070) (0.004) (0.026) 
5 -0.011** -0.021 0.016*** 0.304*** 
 (0.005) (0.086) (0.005) (0.034) 
6+ -0.007 -0.076 0.006 0.338*** 
 (0.005) (0.093) (0.006) (0.040) 
Age and presence of children 
Children under 18 -0.001 0.050 -0.001 -0.119*** 
 (0.003) (0.051) (0.003) (0.013) 
Female head age 
<35 0.029*** -0.183 -0.021*** -0.300*** 
 (0.006) (0.098) (0.006) (0.025) 
35-49 0.023*** -0.108 -0.018*** -0.109*** 
 (0.005) (0.098) (0.005) (0.029) 
50-64 0.019*** -0.120 -0.019*** 0.057* 
 (0.005) (0.095) (0.005) (0.033) 
65+ 0.010** -0.110 -0.017*** 0.053 
 (0.005) (0.096) (0.005) (0.033) 
Female head employment 
Under 30 hours 0.008*** -0.064* -0.006** -0.033*** 
 (0.002) (0.034) (0.002) (0.011) 
30-34 hours 0.004 -0.002 -0.000 -0.059*** 
 (0.003) (0.055) (0.003) (0.017) 
35+ hours 0.001 -0.021 0.003 -0.039*** 
 (0.002) (0.031) (0.002) (0.009) 
Continued 
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Table 15. Continued 
  Organic coffee Non-Organic coffee 
 Probit Demand Probit Demand 
 Variables Prob(Q>0)  ln(Quantity)  Prob(Q>0)  ln(Quantity)   
 
 
Female head education 
Less than HS -0.029*** -0.100 0.017*** 0.103*** 
 (0.004) (0.089) (0.004) (0.025) 
HS graduate -0.024*** -0.087*** 0.017*** 0.075*** 
 (0.002) (0.033) (0.002) (0.011) 
Some college -0.011*** 0.002 0.004** 0.050*** 
 (0.002) (0.030) (0.002) (0.010) 
Female head only 0.004* -0.096** 0.008*** -0.185*** 
 (0.003) (0.044) (0.003) (0.011) 
Race and ethnicity 
Black -0.021*** -0.099** 0.028*** -0.331*** 
 (0.002) (0.047) (0.002) (0.010) 
Asian 0.005 -0.028 -0.002 -0.192*** 
 (0.004) (0.070) (0.005) (0.019) 
Other 0.001 0.044 0.009*** -0.053*** 
 (0.004) (0.087) (0.004) (0.019) 
Non-Hispanic -0.002 0.026 0.004 0.009 
 (0.003) (0.047) (0.003) (0.008) 
Male head only (=1) × 
Male head age 
<35 0.003** -0.188 -0.002 -0.268*** 
 (0.001) (0.299) (0.001) (0.056) 
35-49 0.003*** -0.175 -0.002*** -0.055 
 (0.001) (0.107) (0.001) (0.038) 
50-64 0.002*** -0.046 -0.001*** 0.092*** 
 (0.001) (0.111) (0.001) (0.033) 
Male head employment 
Under 30 hours -0.002** 0.033 0.002*** -0.051 
 (0.001) (0.167) (0.001) (0.044) 
30-34 hours 0.001 -0.195 -0.001 0.056 
 (0.001) (0.202) (0.001) (0.065) 
35+ hours -0.0002 -0.039 0.000 -0.066** 
 (0.000) (0.113) (0.000) (0.028) 
Male head education 
Less than HS -0.004** -0.257 0.003 -0.049 
 (0.002) (0.503) (0.002) (0.080) 
HS graduate -0.003*** -0.262** 0.002*** -0.034 
 (0.001) (0.131) (0.001) (0.033) 
Some college -0.001 -0.068 0.000 0.047* 
 (0.000) 0.091 (0.000) (0.028) 
Observations 5,352   96,147   
*
Marginal effects are all calculated at the means of covariates by using –predictnl- in Stata, in 
which standard errors are computed using the delta method. 
 
Marginal effects for the probit models are calculated and presented in Table 15. 
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The first stage probit model results indicate: compared to households with annual income 
below $25,000, households with higher income were more likely to purchase organic 
coffee. The probability increases with income. For instance, the probability of buying 
organic coffee for household with income in the range of $25,000-$49,999 is 0.6% higher, 
while that for income higher than $70,000 is 1.5% higher (holding education level 
constant).  As the number of household members increases, it less likely that households 
would purchase organic coffee. Hence, relative to single-member households, households 
with more members are less likely to consume organic coffee. Looking at the marginal 
effects, we found that for household size equal to or greater than three members, the 
probability of purchasing organic coffee decrease by around 1%. Presence and age of 
children did not seem to have any impact on households’ decisions to buy organic coffee. 
Households with female heads who were younger than 35 years old and worked less than 
30 hours per week had higher possibilities of buying organic coffee. African Americans 
were less likely to purchase organic coffee when compared with Caucasians. Asian and 
other race had an insignificant effect on the likelihood of purchasing organic coffee. 
Probabilities in purchasing organic coffee for Hispanic origin households with only 
female head were not significantly different from non-Hispanic, households with only 
male head. The level of education of the household head played an important role in the 
purchase of organic coffee. From Table 4, lower levels of education decreased a 
consumer’s likelihood of purchasing organic coffee.  For those households with female 
head on educational levels corresponding to Bachelor’s degree or higher, the likelihood 
of buying organic coffee increased by 3% relative to household female heads with less 
than a high school education or high school graduate. 
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The second stage demand estimation results show the magnitudes of factors 
affecting the amount purchased, once the decision to purchase organic coffee and 
conventional coffee was made. Household income produced predictable results in the 
first stage of the decision (whether to buy organic), but in the second stage of the decision 
(how much to buy), households from all income tiers actually purchased significantly less 
organic coffee than those in the lowest tier, all else constant. In terms of household size, 
there is no significant relationship between household size and the quantity purchased for 
organic coffee. As for race, African Americans were not likely to try organic coffee, and 
those who did were likely to spend much less on organic coffee than Whites, while 
Asians and other races did not differ significantly from Whites in terms of quantities 
purchased for organic coffee. Compared with female heads that held Bachelor’s degree or 
higher, all other education levels had a negative impact on the organic coffee purchase. 
Households with female heads who are high school graduate buy 8.7% less organic 
coffee. Household with male head ages who are high school graduate buy 26.2% less 
organic coffee.  Coefficients on all other variables were statistically insignificant.  
3.5 Conclusions   
 
Both industry and academic studies have investigated the demographic profile of the 
organic consumer and, to date, these studies have yielded conflicting results. This article 
adds to the body of literature by analyzing purchase and demographic data in an effort to 
develop a demographic profile of the organic coffee consumers. The results support the 
findings of some studies and contradict others, which justifies the need for this study as 
consumer demographic profiles might differ significantly by product. For instance, like 
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many other studies, education and income were significant factors, while race, Hispanic 
origin, age and presence of children play different roles in making decisions to buy 
organic products. In addition, our results show the importance of market segmentation 
when analyzing price elasticities.  
As organic markets continue to grow, the findings of this analysis will enhance 
marketing efforts of organic coffee in targeting the primary consumer of organic coffee, 
particularly high-income households who have at least bachelor's degrees, and 
households headed by individuals age under 49. Also, owing to our findings concerning 
own-price elasticities, retailers could raise both prices of organic and conventional coffee 
to increase sales revenue, as demand for both products would only fall proportionally, 
holding all other factors constant.  
3.6 Limitations of the study 
 
Like many models for censoring and truncation, the Heckman’s selection model 
(regardless of the estimator used) rest upon parametric distribution of the unobservable 
error terms in the model (bivariate normality assumption), which has been regarded as a 
potential drawback(Greene, 2012; Puhani, 2000). Sam and Zheng (2010) further argued 
that maximum likelihood and two-step estimators of censored demand systems yield 
biased and inconsistent parameter estimates when the assumed joint distribution of 
disturbances is incorrect. They propose a semiparametric estimator that retains the 
computational advantage of the two-step approach but is immune to distributional 
misspecification (does not assume a normally distributed error in the first-stage equation) 
and accommodates a certain form of heteroskedasticity. The key difference between the 
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proposed estimator and the two-step estimator is that the parameters of the binary 
censoring equations are estimated using a distribution-free single-index model. 
The number of households purchasing only organic coffee was 507, the number 
of households purchasing both organic coffee and conventional coffee was 3,842, and the 
number of households purchasing only conventional coffee was 55,334. Work is 
underway in estimating a polytomous choice model dealing with the aforementioned 
three choices. 
As with most research endeavors, data limitations were encountered. The largest 
constraint is that our data do not account for consumer preferences that underlie a 
consumer’s decision to purchase organic products. Expanding the model to include 
variables that capture nondemographic factors leading to a consumer’s choice to purchase 
organic coffee would likely strengthen the results. One way to gather this hard-to-find 
information would be to ask households in the Nielsen panel questions that capture their 
preferences about health and environmental issues. Including such information would 
make it possible to fine-tune the analysis of the organic consumer’s demographic profile.  
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Appendix  
 
A.1 Derivations of Barten’s Synthetic Model 
Barten’s synthetic model (Barten, 1993) nests four popular demand systems: the 
Rotterdam (R), the FDLAIDS (F), the NBR (N), and the CBS (C) models, which can be 
rewritten so they all have the same right-hand-side terms: 
(A.1.0)    yR  =      wid ln qi                          = θi d ln Q + ∑ 𝜋𝐢𝐣
𝐍
𝒋 = 𝟏 d ln pj, 
(A.1.1)    yF  =      d wi                         = βi d ln Q + ∑ 𝛾𝐢𝐣
𝐍
𝒋 = 𝟏 d ln pj, 
(A.1.2)    yC  =   wi (d ln qi - d ln Q)       = βi d ln Q + ∑ 𝜋𝐢𝐣
𝐍
𝒋 = 𝟏 d ln pj, 
(A.1.3)    yN  =     d wi + wid ln qi            = θi d ln Q + ∑ 𝛾𝐢𝐣
𝐍
𝒋 = 𝟏 d ln pj, 
where wi is the budget share for good i, qi is quantity, pi is price, and d ln Q is the 
Divisia volume index: d ln Q = ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑑 ln 𝑞𝑖
N
𝑗 = 1 .  
The four differential demand systems have the same set of RHS variables. 
However, the four models have different left-hand side (LHS) variables: LHS in the 
Rotterdam model corresponds to the quantity component of the change in the budget 
share; it is simply the change in the budget share of commodity i in the FDLAIDS model; 
the dependent variable in the CBS model is the expenditure share weighted deviation of 
the log change in qi form the average log change in the quantities Q of all n goods, i.e., 
the weighted change in the volume share qi/Q of the ith commodity; NBR’s LHS 
corresponds to the (budget share) weighted change in real expenditure on commodity i. 
The four systems also share similarity and discrepancies in assumptions 
concerning the constancy of certain parameters. The Rotterdam and NBR models have 
the same coefficient on the expenditure term (i.e., θi =
𝜕𝑞𝑖𝑡𝑝𝑖𝑡
𝜕 ∑ 𝑞𝑗𝑡𝑝𝑗𝑡
N
𝑗 = 1
), which is the (constant) 
marginal budget share. FDLAIDS and CBS models share the same marginal budget share 
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(i.e., βi = θi – wi), which varies with the expenditure share. The Slutsky terms (i.e., πij) are 
considered to be constants in the Rotterdam and CBS models and < 0 imposed by 
negativity of the substitution effect. Negativity of the substitution effect does not 
necessarily impose negativity of price coefficients  (i. e. , 𝛾𝐢𝐣) , as in the NBR and 
FDLAIDS models (Neves, 1994). 
Using the matrix expressions, we can combine the four models into the one 
general form:  
(A.1.4)    αRyR + αFyF  + αCyC+ αN yN  =   ΧΩ 
where yi, i = R, C, N, F is a t × 1 vector of transformed basic endogenous 
variables; X is a t × k matrix of exogenous price and expenditure variables; and Ω = αRωR 
+ αCωC + αFωF + αNωN and ωi, i=R, C, N, F compose a k × 1 vector of coefficients. 
Without loss of generality, Barten set the sum of the α’s to one and solved for αR. 
(A.1.5)    αR = 1 - αF - αC - αN. 
Substituting αR into (A.1.4) and solving for yR yields 
(A.1.6)     yR = αC(yR -yC) + αF(yR -yF) + αN(yR -yN) +XΩ. 
Unconstrained estimation of the αs is not possible since αR is a linear combination 
of αF, αC, and αN. However, (A.1. 6) can be rewritten using the fact that 
(A.1.7)    yR - yC + yF - yN = 0, 
or (A.1.8) (yR - yC) - (yR - yF) +(yR - yN) = 0.  
Solving (A.1.8) for yR – yF yields 
(A.1.9) (yR – yF ) = (yR - yC) +(yR - yN),  
           and substituting this into (A.1.6) gives 
(A.1.10 ) yR = XΩ + αC (yR -yC) + αF (yR - yF) + αN (yR –yN)  ,  
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                   = XΩ + (αC + αF) (yR -yC) + (αN + αF) (yR –yN)   
                       = XΩ + δ1(yR -yC) + δ2 (yR –yN)   
The nesting coefficient δ1= αC + αF measures the difference between the marginal 
budget shares of the Rotterdam model and the marginal budget shares of the CBS and 
FDLAIDS models. The nesting coefficient δ2 = αN + αF measures the difference between 
the price coefficients of the Rotterdam model and price coefficients of the FDLAIDS and 
NBR models. 
Substituting (A.1.0) - (A.1.3) into (A.1.10) yields 
(A.1.11 )   wi d ln qi    =   XΩ + δ1 d ln Q + δ2 (wi d ln qi   -  d wi -  wi d ln Q),            
Using the total differential of the budget share 
(A.1.12 )   dwi = wid ln qi + wid ln pi - widln M,  
and the logarithmic differential of the budget equation for rearranging, 
(A.1.13 )    dlnM = dlnP + dlnQ = ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑑 ln 𝑝𝑖
N
𝑗 = 1 + ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑑 ln 𝑞𝑖
N
𝑗 = 1 . 
Barten’s synthetic model takes the form:  
 (A. 1.14 )    𝑤𝑖𝑑𝑙𝑛𝑞𝑖 = 𝛼0 + (𝛼𝑖 + 𝛿1𝑤𝑖)𝑑𝑙𝑛𝑄 + ∑ (𝑏𝑖𝑗 − 𝛿2𝑤𝑖(𝛿𝑖𝑗 − 𝑤𝑗)) 𝑑𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
 
where δ1 and δ2 are nesting parameters, 𝛼𝑖 = δ1βi + (1 – δ1)θi and 𝑏𝑖𝑗  = δ2γij + (1 – 
δ2)πij  are expenditure and price coefficients to be estimated, δik is the Kronecker delta, wi 
is a t × 1 vector of expenditure shares for good i, pi is a t × 1 vector of prices of good k, 
and dlnQ is a t × 1 vector of Divisia volume indexes. 
The following list shows the values for δ1 and δ2 that allow Barten’s synthetic 
model to collapse into the various nested models: 
Rotterdam  δ1 = 0 and  δ2 = 0; FDLAIDS  δ1 = 1 and  δ2 = 1; 
CBS  δ1 = 1 and  δ2 = 0;   NBR  δ1 = 0 and  δ2 = 1. 
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A.2 State Cigarette Excise Tax Rates (Dollars Per 20-Pack), 2011 and 2012
a
 
 2011 2012 
State Tax Rate  Rank Tax Rate  Rank 
Alabama $0.425 46 $0.425 46 
Alaska $2.00 10 $2.00 10 
Arizona $2.00 10 $2.00 10 
Arkansas $1.15 27 $1.15 27 
California $0.87 31 $0.87 31 
Colorado $0.84 32 $0.84 32 
Connecticut $3.00 4 $3.40 3 
Delaware $1.60 19 $1.60 19 
Florida $1.339 24 $1.339 24 
Georgia $0.37 47 $0.37 47 
Hawaii $3.00 4 $3.20 4 
Idaho $0.57 40 $0.57 40 
Illinois $0.98 30 $0.98 30 
Indiana $0.995 29 $0.995 29 
Iowa $1.36 23 $1.36 23 
Kansas $0.79 34 $0.79 34 
Kentucky $0.60 38 $0.60 38 
Louisiana $0.36 48 $0.36 48 
Maine $2.00 10 $2.00 10 
Maryland $2.00 10 $2.00 10 
Massachusetts $2.51 8 $2.51 9 
Michigan $2.00 10 $2.00 10 
Minnesota
b
 $0.48 43 $0.48 43 
Mississippi $0.68 35 $0.68 35 
Missouri $0.17 50 $0.17 50 
Montana $1.70 16 $1.70 15 
Nebraska $0.64 36 $0.64 36 
Nevada $0.80 33 $0.80 33 
New Hampshire $1.78 15 $1.68 17 
New Jersey $2.70 6 $2.70 6 
New Mexico $1.66 18 $1.66 18 
New York $4.35 1 $4.35 1 
North Carolina $0.45 44 $0.45 44 
North Dakota $0.44 45 $0.44 45 
Ohio $1.25 25 $1.25 25 
Oklahoma $1.03 28 $1.03 28 
Oregon $1.18 26 $1.18 26 
Pennsylvania $1.60 19 $1.60 19 
Rhode Island $3.46 2 $3.46 2 
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Note: 
a
. The federal excise tax of $1.0066 per pack and local taxes are not included. 
All the state rates are as of January 1, 2012 and 2012, respectively. New tax rates usually 
become effective in the beginning of the state fiscal years (i.e. July 1st, except for 
Alabama, Michigan, New York and Texas).  
b
. In addition to cigarette excise taxes, Minnesota imposes a $0.75 (per pack) Health 
Impact Fee, which rescinds in June 30, 2013. 
Source: Tax Foundation; Orzechowski & Walker, Tax Burden on Tobacco; state revenue 
departments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
South Dakota $0.57 40 $0.57 40 
South Dakota $1.53 21 $1.53 21 
Tennessee $0.62 37 $0.62 37 
Texas $1.41 22 $1.41 22 
Utah $1.70 16 $1.70 15 
Vermont $2.24 9 $2.62 7 
Virginia $0.30 49 $0.30 49 
Washington $3.025 3 $3.025 5 
West Virginia $0.55 42 $0.55 42 
Wisconsin $2.52 7 $2.52 8 
Wyoming $0.60 38 $0.60 38 
District of 
Columbia 
$2.50 (9) $2.86 (6) 
 93 
TABLE A1 
Cigarette Tax Incidence by County Location 
 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent variable: Tax inclusive cigarette price per 
pack 
Two-way 
Interaction 
effects 
County I: 
on state 
borders, 
the lowest tax 
County II: 
all other 
counties 
on state 
borders 
County III: 
counties not on 
state borders 
State excise tax (tax) 0.999
***
 1.185
***
 0.975
***
 1.024
***
 
 (0.023) (0.051) (0.023) (0.026) 
County I
*
tax 0.142
***
    
 (0.048)    
County III
*
tax 0.047    
 (0.037)    
County I -0.209
***
    
 (0.080)    
County III -0.145
**
    
 (0.070)    
Style 0.609
***
 0.643
***
 0.637
***
 0.585
***
 
 (0.014) (0.032) (0.025) (0.020) 
Type 0.049
***
 0.037
***
 0.016
*
 0.068
***
 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.010) 
Strength light 0.307
***
 0.286
***
 0.320
***
 0.308
***
 
 (0.004) (0.011) (0.007) (0.006) 
Strength ultra light 0.465
***
 0.428
***
 0.481
***
 0.471
***
 
 (0.008) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) 
Carton -0.493
***
 -0.421
***
 -0.361
***
 -0.541
***
 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.041) (0.062) 
Premium brand 0.773
***
 0.804
***
 0.803
***
 0.756
***
 
 (0.017) (0.045) (0.038) (0.022) 
Unemployment rate -0.043
***
 -0.050
**
 -0.077
***
 -0.034
**
 
 (0.008) (0.016) (0.013) (0.011) 
Per capita income ($1,000) 0.005
**
 0.002 -0.011 0.011
**
 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.004) 
High school grads -0.185 -3.456
*
 0.528 1.640
*
 
 (0.817) (1.352) (1.107) (0.750) 
College degree and higher 0.348 -1.401 0.943 1.430
**
 
(0.532) (0.802) (0.780) (0.478) 
Male population -2.980
**
 -3.359 -6.923
**
 -0.663 
 (1.215) (2.842) (2.259) (1.445) 
Black -0.716
***
 -0.731
*
 -0.738
**
 -0.525
***
 
 (0.161) (0.290) (0.246) (0.155) 
AIAN 0.739
*
 0.015 0.78 1.841
***
 
 (0.391) (0.327) (0.587) (0.464) 
Asian 0.027 -1.709 7.465
*
 -0.352 
 (0.826) (2.091) (3.712) (0.816) 
Hispanic -0.312 -0.231 0.301 -0.267 
 (0.239) (0.446) (0.464) (0.262) 
Age 15-24 0.383 -1.093 2.583 -0.193 
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 (1.083) (2.002) (1.704) (1.522) 
Age 25-44 0.834 7.66 4.151 -1.792 
 (1.631) (4.310) (2.303) (2.042) 
Age 45-64 -0.847 -1.903 4.842
**
 -2.313 
 (1.119) (2.395) (1.612) (1.671) 
Age 65 + 0.937 5.579
*
 2.193 -0.656 
 (1.103) (2.678) (1.810) (1.365) 
Constant 4.994
***
 5.264
*
 4.255
*
 3.558
**
 
 (1.053) (2.201) (1.678) (1.177) 
Observations 6,587,905 1,489,564 1,464,370 3,633,971 
R-squared 0.746 0.768 0.762 0.697 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the county level are in parentheses. 
***
 Significant at 1%, 
**
 Significant at 5%, 
*
 Significant at 10%. 
All regressions include county fixed effects, purchase month fixed effects, product 
attribute variables as well as the full set of economic, social, demographic controls 
shown in Table 3. 
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TABLE A2 
Separate Regression Results For Cigarette Tax Incidence By Product Group 
  
Independent  
Variables 
Dependent variable: Tax inclusive cigarette price per 
pack 
(1) 
Premium 
carton 
(2)  
Premium 
pack 
(3)  
Discount 
pack 
(4)  
Discount 
carton 
State excise tax (tax) 1.213
***
        1.043
***
   1.022
***
       1.084
***
 
 
(0.019) (0.023) (0.018) (0.013) 
Style 1.187
***
 0.721
***
 -0.309
***
 -0.199
***
 
 
(0.019) (0.021) (0.022) (0.047) 
Type 0.224
***
 0.058
***
 -0.081
***
 0.010 
 
(0.008) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) 
Strength light 0.277
***
 0.410
***
 0.103
***
 0.065
***
 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) 
Strength ultra light  0.300
***
 0.620
***
 0.198
***
 0.015 
 
(0.011) (0.009) (0.012) (0.013) 
Unemployment rate -0.002 -0.049
***
 -0.057
***
 -0.003 
 (0.004) (0.010) (0.008) (0.005) 
Per capita income ($1,000) 0.004
***
 0.008
***
 0.004
*
 0.003
***
 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) 
High school grads -0.249 -0.448 0.585 0.491 
 (0.502) (1.383) (0.917) (0.457) 
College degree and higher -0.040 0.191 0.594 0.055 
(0.307) (1.012) (0.651) (0.275) 
Male population -0.179 -5.438
***
 -2.384
*
 1.721
**
 
 (0.851) (1.802) (1.427) (0.826) 
Black 0.113 -1.171
***
 -0.991
***
 0.120 
 (0.110) (0.280) (0.189) (0.106) 
AIAN 0.226
*
 0.938
*
 0.764
*
 0.301
**
 
 (0.116) (0.479) (0.395) (0.144) 
Asian 0.410 -0.364 -0.481 0.177 
 (0.434) (1.097) (0.927) (0.465) 
Hispanic 0.164 -0.360 -0.500
*
 0.072 
 (0.129) (0.347) (0.264) (0.121) 
Age 15-24 0.883 1.290 -0.765 -0.954 
 (0.741) (1.365) (1.134) (0.687) 
Age 25-44 -0.743 2.744 -0.794 -3.368
***
 
 (1.061) (2.189) (1.730) (1.043) 
Age 45-64 2.619
***
 -0.457 -3.429
***
 0.111 
 (0.573) (1.399) (1.268) (0.644) 
Age 65 + -0.430 1.951 -0.197 -2.955
***
 
 (0.706) (1.358) (1.011) (0.694) 
Constant 2.681
***
 6.105
***
 6.120
***
 3.028
***
 
 (0.533) (1.537) (1.140) (0.549) 
Observations 908,417 4,000,462 1,341,922 337,104 
R-squared 0.808 0.716 0.689 0.766 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the county level are in parentheses. 
 96 
           
***
 Significant at 1%, 
**
 Significant at 5%, 
*
 Significant at 10%.  
All regressions include county fixed effects, purchase month fixed effects, product 
attribute variables as well as the full set of economic, social, demographic controls 
shown in Table 3. 
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TABLE A3 
Categorization of Cigarette Brands as either Premium or Discount 
Brand Description Category Manufacturer  
1839 Discount U.S. Flue-Cured Tobacco Growers 
1st Class Discount U.S. Flue-Cured Tobacco Growers 
305's Discount Dosal Tobacco Corporation 
305's Silver Discount Dosal Tobacco Corporation 
Basic Discount Philip Morris USA 
Benson & Hedges Premium Philip Morris USA 
Cambridge Discount Philip Morris USA 
Camel Premium RJ Reynolds 
Camel Crush Premium RJ Reynolds 
Camel Exotic Blends Premium RJ Reynolds 
Camel Ninety Nines Premium RJ Reynolds 
Camel No. 9 Premium RJ Reynolds 
Camel Signature Premium RJ Reynolds 
Camel Turkish Gold Premium RJ Reynolds 
Camel Turkish Jade Premium RJ Reynolds 
Camel Turkish Royal Premium RJ Reynolds 
Camel Turkish Silver Premium RJ Reynolds 
Camel Wides Premium RJ Reynolds 
Capri Premium RJ Reynolds 
Carlton's Premium RJ Reynolds 
Checkers Discount King Maker Marketing 
Chesterfield Premium Philip Morris USA 
Ctl Br Discount  
Decade Discount Cheyenne International, LLC 
Doral Discount RJ Reynolds 
Eclipse Discount RJ Reynolds 
Eve Discount Ligget Group 
Fortuna Discount Commonwealth Brands 
Gold Coast Discount King Maker Marketing 
GPC Discount RJ Reynolds 
Grand Prix Discount Ligget Group 
Kamel Discount RJ Reynolds 
Kent Premium Lorillard Tobacco Company 
Kent Golden Lights Premium Lorillard Tobacco Company 
Kent III Premium Lorillard Tobacco Company 
Kool Premium RJ Reynolds 
Kool Flow Premium RJ Reynolds 
Kool Groove Premium RJ Reynolds 
Kool Xl Premium RJ Reynolds 
L & M Premium Philip Morris USA 
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L & M Turkish Night Premium Philip Morris USA 
Liggett Select Discount Ligget Group 
Lucky Strike Premium RJ Reynolds 
Major Brand Discount  
Marlboro Premium Philip Morris USA 
Marlboro Blend No. 27 Premium Philip Morris USA 
Marlboro Blend No. 54 Premium Philip Morris USA 
Marlboro Eighty-Threes Premium Philip Morris USA 
Marlboro NXT Premium Philip Morris USA 
Marlboro Skyline Premium Philip Morris USA 
Marlboro Special Blend Premium Philip Morris USA 
Maverick Discount Lorillard Tobacco Company 
Maverick Silver Discount Lorillard Tobacco Company 
Merit Premium Philip Morris USA 
Merit Ultima Premium Philip Morris USA 
Misty Discount RJ Reynolds 
Monarch Discount RJ Reynolds 
More Premium RJ Reynolds 
More White Lights Premium RJ Reynolds 
Natural American Spirit Premium Santa Fe Natural Tobacco Co 
Newport Premium Lorillard Tobacco Company 
Newport Ice Premium Lorillard Tobacco Company 
Newport M Blend Premium Lorillard Tobacco Company 
Now Premium RJ Reynolds 
Old Gold Discount Lorillard Tobacco Company 
Pall Mall Discount RJ Reynolds 
Pall Mall Red Discount RJ Reynolds 
Parliament Premium Philip Morris USA 
Pyramid Discount Ligget Group 
Raleigh Discount RJ Reynolds 
Rave Discount Commonwealth Brands 
Salem Premium RJ Reynolds 
Salem Green Label Premium RJ Reynolds 
Saratoga Premium Philip Morris USA 
Sonoma Discount Commonwealth Brands 
Tahoe Discount S&M Brands, Inc. 
Tareyton Premium RJ Reynolds 
Tourney Discount Ligget Group 
True Premium Lorillard Tobacco Company 
Tuscany Discount Commonwealth Brands 
USA Discount Vector Tobacco, Inc 
USA Gold Discount Vector Tobacco, Inc 
Vantage Premium RJ Reynolds 
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Viceroy Discount RJ Reynolds 
Virginia Slims Premium Philip Morris USA 
Virginia Slims Luxury Premium Philip Morris USA 
Virginia Slims Superslims Premium Philip Morris USA 
Wave Discount Japan Tobacco International 
Wides Discount  
WildHorse Discount U.S. Flue-Cured Tobacco Growers 
Winston Premium RJ Reynolds 
Winston S2 Premium RJ Reynolds 
Winston Select Premium RJ Reynolds 
Source: Brand categorization is from the supplementary file of the paper: Cornelius, Monica E., 
et al. (2013). Trends in the use of premium and discount cigarette brands: findings from the ITC 
US Surveys (2002–2011). Tobacco control, tobaccocontrol-2013.  
Manufacturer information is from Tobacco Product Manufacturers Directory, Department of 
Revenue, Massachusetts.  
Alphabetic Listing of Cigarette Brands, Nebreska Department of Revenue.  
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